By Michael J. Armstrong

The United States and Israel have repeatedly boasted about airstrikes in their current war with Iran. In Week 1, they claimed the destruction of 75 per cent of Iran’s missile launchers. By Week 2, they had reduced Iranian missile fire by 90 per cent and said the war was “already won in many ways.”

And yet, Iran keeps damaging refineries and blocking tankers from crossing the Strait of Hormuz.

The country has certainly suffered many tactical losses. But its missiles and drones have been strategically successful.

Iran so far has launched at least 5,400 such projectiles. Surprisingly, less than a tenth of them have targeted Israel, its traditional rival.

Missiles over Israel

Israel faced about 450 Iranian missile attacks during the war’s first four weeks. The rate of fire fell rapidly after the first weekend but has never halted.

Some missiles carry several hundred kilograms of explosives, enough to destroy an entire building. The rest instead dispense dozens of cluster bombs over wide areas. Those are less powerful but still lethal.

Israel’s long-range Arrow interceptors engage the missiles first. Its mid-range David’s Sling and short-range Iron Dome interceptors provide backup. (The country’s Iron Beam lasers are not being used.) Together, they’ve reportedly intercepted 92 per cent of incoming missiles.

But interceptors sometimes miss. And their supply is limited. Consequently, at least nine large warheads and 150 cluster bombs have hit populated areas.

These numbers imply that almost all Iranian missiles are accurate enough to need interception. By contrast, during Israel’s earlier conflicts with Gaza in 2008, 2011 and 2014, less than a third of incoming rockets were so accurate.

Meanwhile, more than 90 per cent of Iran’s missiles and drones have targeted Arab countries in the Persian Gulf.

Drones across the Persian Gulf

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) collectively reported around 4,900 Iranian attacks during the first four weeks. Only one fifth were missiles: the rest were drones.

These countries have stated they are neutral in the war. However, they do have defence agreements with the U.S., and some host American military facilities.

These countries defend themselves using weapons like the U.S.-made Patriot and Israeli-made SPYDER interceptors. Drone experts from Ukraine now advise the defenders too.

For example, the UAE reported attacks by 1,835 drones, 378 ballistic missiles and 15 cruise missiles. As of March 10, it claimed to have intercepted 94 per cent of the drones and 99 per cent of the missiles.

The deadliness of these attacks has varied.

Continuing lethality

In Israel, Iranian missiles have killed 20 people, implying roughly 4.1 deaths per hundred missiles arriving.

That’s less than the 5.1 the country saw during its 2025 war with Iran. But it’s four to 40 times higher than the rates it suffered from rockets in earlier Gaza and Lebanon conflicts.

In the Persian Gulf, Iranian projectiles have killed at least 15 civilians, 13 U.S. soldiers and seven merchant sailors.

There were about 0.6 deaths per hundred Iranian attacks in Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE combined. That’s much lower than Israel’s rate, presumably because those countries were attacked by drones and short-range missiles carrying smaller warheads.

Interestingly, although the quantity of Iranian attacks fell after the first week, their lethality did not. Death rates per projectile in Arab countries showed little change week-to-week. In Israel, the rates were highest in Week 3.

In fact, Iranian missiles keep hitting precise targets, like U.S. military aircraft parked beside runways.

This implies Iran’s government has recovered from its initial surprise. It’s likely benefiting from Russian intelligence and Chinese technology too.

Tactical U.S. vs strategic Iran

So, U.S. and Israeli warplanes have bombed thousands of targets, killed thousands of civilians, and slowed Iran’s missile fire. But they haven’t stopped it.

That’s not surprising. Airstrikes alone didn’t stop rocket fire during Israel’s previous conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon. Ground invasions were needed for that.

U.S. President Donald Trump can post jingoistic mashup videos and “bullshit” about having “militarily won” the war in Iran. But he hasn’t achieved strategic outcomes like “unconditional surrender” from Iran or regime change there.

By contrast, Iran’s missiles have been strategically effective. They’ve damaged Persian Gulf refineries and halted tanker traffic. They’ve forced Trump to relax sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil, and on Belarusian fertilizer. And they’ve shown Arab monarchies that U.S. defence agreements have limited value.

Trump recently, and inadvertently, admitted this weakness. While discussing Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, he said “it would be great if we could do something, but they have to open it.”

This strategic failure despite tactical success is reminiscent of the Vietnam War. U.S. units had overwhelming firepower as they killed enemy soldiers. But body counts by themselves indicated little about strategic progress.

Some historians rank that war as the second worst U.S. foreign policy decision ever. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was ranked the worst.

Trump talks about being the greatest U.S. president in history. So, perhaps his Iran war will make him the new leader on that policy failure list.

The post Iran’s attacks drone on, with the U.S. at risk of losing the war appeared first on Thoughtful Journalism About Energy's Future.

by John Duncan

The Iranian regime is certainly brutal. But it’s also powerful as it continues to project its might after a month of illegal air strikes by the United States and Israel.

Read more: Iran’s attacks drone on, with the U.S. at risk of losing the war

Iran is in the top 10 per cent of countries by size and population, has the third largest proven petroleum reserves and controls strategically crucial geography.

Furthermore, both the regime and many ordinary Iranians are prepared to defend the country. Since 1953, when the U.S. helped orchestrate a coup to overthrow Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, Iranians have understood they’re in America’s crosshairs.

This was especially true after the 1979 Islamic Revolution that overthrew the shah and during the U.S.-backed Iraq war against Iran that killed a million Iranians in the 1980s. As a result, Iran has spent decades beefing up and decentralizing its military capability.

In contrast, Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned U.S. President Donald Trump in February that the U.S. was short on both munitions and allied support for a war against Iran. Israel, America’s partner in war, is also short, especially in interceptor munitions. Trump and Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed the concerns, which suggests they planned a short war.

What are Trump’s options?

Critics have accused Trump of dragging the U.S. — or allowing it to be dragged — into a “forever war.” Those critics include those in his MAGA base, a problem for Trump as he anticipates November’s mid-term elections.

One unconventional option that might expedite victory, discussed during Trump’s first term, is to use nuclear weapons against Iran. Trump has said nukes won’t be used, but he’s well-known for erratic reversals.

A nuclear strike might expedite surrender, but it took two strikes on Japan in 1945 before the Japanese surrendered, and, failing an Iranian surrender, several strikes might be required to destroy the military capability distributed across Iran’s 31 provinces. Because many Americans would be appalled by a nuclear attack, putting the mid-terms at risk, the nuclear option is unlikely.

Much of the concern about Trump’s election machinations heading into the mid-terms is focused on the manipulation of procedures and officials. The legacy of the Jan. 6, 2021 attacks on the U.S. Capitol is one extreme possibility, as is manipulating the Iran war to achieve electoral gains.

Trump will probably lean into his rhetorical strengths and try to convince Americans the U.S. has won when it hasn’t. Claiming victory in the face of its absence is not new to him. Even in his second term, Trump continues to push the false claim that he won the 2020 election.

Consider the bizarre drama that started on March 21 when Trump and Iran exchanged dire threats. Then, out of the blue, Trump declared the existence of peace talks, which Iran denied. Perhaps they are imaginary talks on the way to an imaginary victory for Trump.

Read more: Why Donald Trump is such a relentless bullshitter

Mission accomplished?

It seems clear Trump is planning to declare victory well ahead of the mid-terms — and in part because of them. Such a strategy would involve baiting opponents into “forever war” criticisms, only to ridicule them in stump speeches, generating the image of a president who finishes his wars.

A declared victory in Iran and a timely exit, in addition to the liberation of Venezuela and a possible Cuban coup, might all coalesce into potent election messaging for the Republicans.

Soon enough, Trump may announce something akin to former president George W. Bush’s premature proclamations about the Iraq War in 2003 by saying something like this:

“Major combat operations in Iran have ended. The United States and Israel have prevailed. We do not know the day of final victory, but we have seen the turning of the tide.”

If successful, he will secure two more years “like nobody’s ever seen before” of Republican congressional dominance.

Major obstacles

The battle for November will feature a few competing narratives in the U.S. But there are four major hurdles for Trump in particular.

• Information: For voters to be convinced that Trump is a decisive crusader against evil rather than another “forever war” president, right-wing media must sell yet another big lie, mainstream media must continue to pull its punches and the Democrats must continue to flounder.
• Affordability crisis: Trump also has to ensure he doesn’t “win” in Iran while losing on affordability at home. Most American oil comes from the U.S., Canada and Mexico, so the U.S. is protected from global supply disruptions, but global markets push up prices everywhere. Trump’s mere declaration of talks recently brought oil prices down, but only temporarily.
• Allies needed: Because voters will want to see a significant military withdrawal, Trump needs other countries to manage the chaos he’s created. But after disrespecting allies for months, he is struggling to establish a “coalition of the willing” on which to offload the conflict.
• Iranians must co-operate: But because the U.S. and Israel have twice attacked Iran during diplomatic negotiations, Iran needs other stakeholders in the process. Without them, Iran will not be incentivized to stop fighting and nothing will belie an imaginary Trump victory more than ongoing Iranian attacks.

Democracy waning

Whichever scenario prevails, Americans will likely lose. Their complete war costs could include repercussions from the unprecedented illegal bombing of Iran, as well as from unnecessarily turning regional allies into targets.

All of this is tied to what many Americans regard as increasing Israeli aggression, including the killing of 70,000 people in Gaza, which the U.S. has facilitated with funding, political cover and its widely mocked Board of Peace.

America’s democracy, economy and credibility are waning as Trump shamelessly pursues self-aggrandizement and self-enrichment.

“That makes me smart,” he might say, but only a failed leader serves his own interests at the expense of his country.

The post Why Donald Trump will try to declare victory in Iran well before November appeared first on Thoughtful Journalism About Energy's Future.

By Fatih Birol, Executive Director

The post 7 certainties about energy for this age of uncertainty appeared first on Thoughtful Journalism About Energy's Future.

By Jorge H. Sanchez-Perez

The American invasion of Venezuela — along with fresh threats to annex Greenland — provide the world with a unique opportunity to perform a post-mortem examination on what was once known as the international rules-based legal order.

This legal order was based on rules enshrined in the United Nations Charter of 1945. Its collapse creates uncertainty that requires careful consideration from all those interested in world peace.

Read more: Trump’s intervention in Venezuela: the 3 warnings for the world

First, however, it’s important to understand what legal orders are and how they can collapse.

Social rules come in different forms — some might be religious, some moral. But complex political communities tend to be ruled by another set of rules, legal ones.

Legal rules tend to be organized in what are commonly called legal orders, and these orders guide the actions of members of the political communities in their everyday lives. One goal of most legal orders is, usually, co-ordination among those who are part of a social group.

When we think about legal orders, we usually focus on the ones that are closer to our political communities, such as those connected to our cities, provinces and states. But there’s one legal order that tends to be ignored more often than not — the international legal order.

International law

One defining feature of international legal orders is that they are far removed from people within their own political communities, so negotiations to establish shared rules are usually carried out by representatives of large states or other powerful political entities.

Even though the international legal order feels isolated from everyday rules — like city laws telling us which side of the road to drive on — it shares the same basic features that make any system of co-ordination work.

One key feature is meeting the expectations of the people within a political community. For a legal order to last over time, it must do this. In other words, because legal orders are systems of co-ordination, they tend to endure as long as their rules are expected and accepted, even if those rules are unjust.

Although some people believe that a law must be just to count as law, that view is hard to sustain when we look at the past few hundred years of human history. Many periods offer clear examples of both domestic and international legal systems that upheld deeply unjust and morally troubling positions.

Yet it would be difficult to argue that there was no legal order in places like the Ottoman Empire or Nazi Germany. In both cases, genocide — among the gravest moral failures imaginable — occurred within functioning legal systems. This suggests that legal orders can persist even while enabling repeated immoral actions.

History also shows, however, that legal orders do collapse, and often more quickly and more frequently than many might expect.

The Ottoman Empire and Nazi Germany, for example, ceased to exist a long time ago. From a broader historical perspective, the legal order of the Roman Republic in the second century BCE no longer exists and bears little resemblance to the system governing modern Rome within Italy today.

Like the other legal orders mentioned, the post–Second World War order increasingly looks like a relic rather than a binding reality — a fact we must clearly recognize if we hope to save some of its positive features.

Fundamental rights

After the Second World War, one of the main agreements among most political communities around the world was that the previously held right to wage wars against other countries was no longer acceptable. Sovereignty consequently became one of the cornerstones of the international legal order.

This was enshrined in Articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter. The logic was simple: as the charter’s preamble notes, repeated wars had brought immense suffering to people entitled to fundamental rights based on their dignity, worth and equality. As a result, this new order abolished the right of political communities to wage war for any reason.

In practice, however, this order rested on a watered-down version of that ideal. Even when sovereignty and human rights were violated via military action, the appearance of an aim to protect them had to be maintained. Powerful states could breach these principles so long as they preserved the illusion that they were attempting to uphold and safeguard sovereignty and rights.

This unspoken rule — that power could override law if the façade remained intact — underpinned the international legal order from 1945 to 2023.

As the world watched the assault on Gaza unfold — deemed a genocide by the United Nations — many western political communities that had helped build the post-war legal order abandoned even the pretense that sustained it.

Once the illusion of respect for sovereignty and human rights collapsed, the system lost a key element that had kept it functioning. This is why I’ve argued previously that the rules-based international order went to Gaza to die at the hands of those who created it.

Annexation made easy

Unlike U.S. President George W. Bush’s war in Iraq, which was framed by American diplomats as defending human rights, Donald Trump’s invasion of Venezuela and the capture of Nicolás Maduro weren’t presented as respecting any lofty principles.

His actions were grounded on the views that the U.S. has a claim to Venezuela’s oil. The intervention was driven by economic interests and hearkened back to the the Monroe Doctrine, an 1823 U.S. policy that promoted American dominance of the Western Hemisphere.

The events in Venezuela suggest the post-1945 international legal order, which emphasized sovereignty and fundamental rights, has been replaced by one more like the pre-Second World War system, when nations could go to war for almost any reason.

Read more: Trump’s squeeze of Venezuela goes beyond Monroe Doctrine – in ideology, intent and scale, it’s unprecedented

Under the legal order now in place, Canada and Greenland could easily be the next targets of American annexation. Similarly, Taiwan could be annexed by China and Ukraine by Russia.

What the world is witnessing now is the international rules-based order being stripped of whatever value it once had. It is time to accept this reality if we are to build a better international order next time.

The post Venezuela attack, Greenland threats and Gaza assault mark the collapse of international legal order appeared first on Thoughtful Journalism About Energy's Future.

With Jacob Blanc

The United States military recently carried out a covert operation to capture and then remove Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, transporting them from Caracas to New York. The pair is accused of narco-terrorism, conspiracy, drug trafficking and money laundering.

President Donald Trump announced that the U.S. will temporarily “run” Venezuela until a “safe, proper and judicious transition” can be ensured. Trump also announced Venezeula was handing over up to 50 million barrels of oil to the U.S. to be sold at “market price.”

Read more: A predawn op in Latin America? The US has been here before, but the seizure of Venezuela’s Maduro is still unprecedented

There’s nothing new about the American desire to put an end to the Maduro regime. In March 2020, during Trump’s first term, Maduro was indicted by the U.S. on narco-terrorism and cocaine trafficking charges. A reward of US$15 million was offered for his arrest. But the U.S. had been increasing pressure on Venezuela for months through both military and diplomatic tactics.

Nor is it the first time that the U.S. has intervened militarily in Latin America. It happened in Grenada and Panama in 1983 and in Honduras in 1988.

But an intervention of this magnitude in a large South American country is unprecedented. Jacob Blanc, a Latin American specialist and professor in the history department at McGill University, explains.

The Conversation Canada: Were you surprised by the American intervention in Caracas?

Jacob Blanc: Yes, I was, especially because of how audacious it was. There is a long history of American interventions in Latin America, but in the larger countries these have generally been carried out in a more subtle way. The United States has supported regime changes when they are perceived as pro-Communist or anti-American. But this case — a military intervention in the middle of the night at the presidential palace and the abduction of the leader of a modern country — is unusual. What’s more, Trump is not touching the political system. He is leaving the regime in place, with Vice-President Delcy Rodriguez as interim president. This is unprecedented.

TCC: What kind of relationship did the United States have with Venezuela?

J.B.: Venezuela is particularly important to Americans because it was the country where one of the first independence movements against the Spanish took place. This was where the colonial wars took root, and where [military and political leader] Simón Bolívar proposed unifying the South American hemisphere in a confederation. Bolivar’s plan did not succeed, but Venezuela was at the forefront of this movement. Then, in the 20th century, oil was discovered in several countries in northern South America, including Venezuela — which has the largest reserves in the world — and Colombia. The economy benefited, but this also created regional problems.

The region became more important to the Americans in the 1990s with the instability in the Middle East. With the rise to power of Hugo Chávez, [president from 1999 until his death], and his left-wing ideas, relations cooled. Chávez became the bête noire of the Americans, who accused him of corruption, among other things.

An oil embargo was imposed in 2019, which considerably weakened the oil sector. Under Hugo Chavez, the oil sector was already slowing down, mainly due to corruption. It will take years and a lot of money for the Americans to get it back on track, but the Americans themselves created part of the problem with the embargo.

TCC: How do other South American countries view this intervention?

J.B.: It depends on their ideology. Brazil, Mexico and Colombia, which are more left-wing, have denounced the intervention, but Argentina and Chile have supported it. In my opinion, this will accentuate the divide between the two ideologies present in South America, but this situation is not really new. For Cuba, the threat is real. But an American intervention on the island would be purely ideological, as the country has almost nothing to offer. It would be a trophy for Trump to show off.

TCC: Trump’s bellicose rhetoric against Colombia is surprising, given that the country is a democracy. How should we interpret this?

J.B.: Yes, it surprises me a little. But at the same time, it makes sense: the official justification for the intervention against Venezuela is the illegal entry of drugs into the United States. But Venezuela is a small player. Colombia, on the other hand, is a very large exporter. So if the justification is true, that makes it all the easier to do the same thing in Colombia.

TCC: What message is Trump sending to the rest of the world?

J.B.: Trump’s actions are reminiscent of what Putin is doing in Ukraine, and what Xi Jinping could do in Taiwan or other neighbouring countries. This jeopardizes the international rules that nations established after the Second World War, when they set up a system — which might be weak, but it’s still a system — to prevent wars.

Read more: Venezuela attack, Greenland threats and Gaza assault mark the collapse of international legal order

TCC: What does the future hold for Venezuela?

J.B.: It will all depend on the type of administration Trump supports. For now, he is not changing the regime or the system and says he wants to manage it from a distance, through various incentives. I believe the Trump administration is crossing its fingers and hoping that the new presidency will not implode due to internal factions. We can expect infighting within the current government, as well as with the military.

Many want power. Donald Trump wants to have his cake and eat it too. He wants to make the operation look like a victory without any risks or costs; without sending soldiers who could lose their lives. But nothing is less certain. And if chaos spreads in the region, particularly in Colombia, it will be Trump’s fault. He has taken a very, very risky gamble.

The post Maduro’s capture: ‘Trump has taken an unprecedented and very risky gamble’: Historian appeared first on Thoughtful Journalism About Energy's Future.

By Michael Williams

In the few weeks since United States President Donald Trump returned to the White House, world leaders and commentators have struggled to make sense of his approach to foreign policy, including tariffs, alliance renegotiations and threats of territorial appropriation.

No one is sure how much is bluff or negotiating tactics, nor how much is deadly serious.

For some, Trump’s foreign policy is simply incoherent, but most try to fit his approach into the familiar choice between isolationism and internationalism.

But there’s a third possibility: Trump’s second presidency marks a contemporary twist on an older form of continentalist geopolitics with important implications for Canada and the world.

‘Great Powers’

Although it has been largely missing from foreign policy debates in the post-Second World War era, continentalist geopolitics has a long and often controversial history.

In the 19th century and the first half of the 20th, it envisioned a world divided into “great spaces,” each dominated by a different “Great Power.” According to this perspective, not all regions are equally important, and continentalist geopolitics does not require a choice between internationalism and isolationism.

Instead, continentalism recommends that Great Powers like the U.S. — with its massive financial, natural and industrial resources — concentrate on controlling territory, the regions surrounding it and the crucial transportation routes on its continental fringes.

Pressure is placed on countries whose importance is determined by their geopolitical proximity, and those that are least able to resist due to their dense connections and relative dependence on the U.S.

The objective is not just to gain specific advantages; it’s to force neighbours into even tighter economic and infrastructural connections and dependence. The obvious countries in this scenario are Canada and Mexico, and it’s therefore unsurprising that both have been the targets of Trump’s significant tariff threats and other coercive measures.

When Ontario Premier Doug Ford talks about the need for tighter continental ties through a continental AmCan arrangement, he provides exactly the desired reaction.

Pressuring neighbours

Beyond geographically contiguous states, continentalist geopolitics also focuses on areas that command key strategic passages and trade routes, especially those currently controlled by weaker powers.

For the U.S., Panama, with its canal, fits the bill. Danish-administered Greenland, with its natural resources and geographic importance in a rapidly thawing Arctic region, is another. It’s unsurprising that these countries, along with Canada, were a Trump focus in the first weeks of his second administration.

Today, continentalist geopolitics recognizes the multi-polarity and “multi-alignment” in world politics.

It’s not isolationist, but it recognizes that waning American power in an inter-connected world gives more distant states the ability to resist U.S. pressure by making deals with a wide range of other countries. In this setting, an interventionist global role is neither possible nor desirable, and the U.S. should refrain from global commitments.

As U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated in one of his first interviews after taking office:

“It’s not normal for the world to simply have a unipolar power… that was an anomaly. It was a product of the end of the Cold War, but eventually you were going to reach back to a point where you had a multi-polar world, multi-great powers in different parts of the planet. We face that now with China and to some extent Russia.”

No commitment to global stability

The continentalist perspective does not require a complete separation from the world economic or security order. Trade, financial and technology flows can be encouraged, but their basis would be a re-industrialized and more self-sufficient core, well-insulated from economic and security threats.

Extended interests, such as European stability, could be minimized by increasing the cost burden to allies and minimizing fixed commitments. A powerful global capacity with a “light” geographic footprint is the preferred posture.

Calls for increased defence spending by NATO allies and for European responsibility in enforcing a post-war settlement in Ukraine logically follow.

The continentalist playbook is content to leave the management of distant regions to other powers, each pre-eminent in their part of the world. That means participation in international organizations is minimized.

Foreign aid should reflect American interests, with involvement depending on the costs and benefits, not any automatic commitment to global stability. Feeding the world’s most extensive development agency, USAID, “into the wood-chipper” — to quote Elon Musk — is a page taken straight from this kind of geopolitician’s handbook.

Unsavoury history

The possibility that a continentalist geopolitics underpins recent U.S. foreign policy initiatives has received too little attention in Canada.

It’s not yet clear that the actions of America’s new administration represent the rise, much less the triumph, of Trumpian geopolitics. Nor is there any guarantee that such a vision would or will succeed.

But there is enough evidence to suggest we should take the possibility seriously. Since 1945, America’s foreign policy options have resided somewhere between internationalism and isolationism. But a geopolitical vision of world politics as a diverse canvas of large territory dominated by different Great Powers have a long, if often unsavoury, history in foreign policy.

A southern neighbour pursuing a such a geopolitical approach would mark a radical transformation in world order and pose huge challenges for Canada. Canadians should at least be prepared for the possibility.

The post Opinion: Trump’s potential embrace of ‘continentalist geopolitics’ poses grave risks to Canada appeared first on Thoughtful Journalism About Energy's Future.