By Michael J. Armstrong

The United States and Israel have repeatedly boasted about airstrikes in their current war with Iran. In Week 1, they claimed the destruction of 75 per cent of Iran’s missile launchers. By Week 2, they had reduced Iranian missile fire by 90 per cent and said the war was “already won in many ways.”

And yet, Iran keeps damaging refineries and blocking tankers from crossing the Strait of Hormuz.

The country has certainly suffered many tactical losses. But its missiles and drones have been strategically successful.

Iran so far has launched at least 5,400 such projectiles. Surprisingly, less than a tenth of them have targeted Israel, its traditional rival.

Missiles over Israel

Israel faced about 450 Iranian missile attacks during the war’s first four weeks. The rate of fire fell rapidly after the first weekend but has never halted.

Some missiles carry several hundred kilograms of explosives, enough to destroy an entire building. The rest instead dispense dozens of cluster bombs over wide areas. Those are less powerful but still lethal.

Israel’s long-range Arrow interceptors engage the missiles first. Its mid-range David’s Sling and short-range Iron Dome interceptors provide backup. (The country’s Iron Beam lasers are not being used.) Together, they’ve reportedly intercepted 92 per cent of incoming missiles.

But interceptors sometimes miss. And their supply is limited. Consequently, at least nine large warheads and 150 cluster bombs have hit populated areas.

These numbers imply that almost all Iranian missiles are accurate enough to need interception. By contrast, during Israel’s earlier conflicts with Gaza in 2008, 2011 and 2014, less than a third of incoming rockets were so accurate.

Meanwhile, more than 90 per cent of Iran’s missiles and drones have targeted Arab countries in the Persian Gulf.

Drones across the Persian Gulf

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) collectively reported around 4,900 Iranian attacks during the first four weeks. Only one fifth were missiles: the rest were drones.

These countries have stated they are neutral in the war. However, they do have defence agreements with the U.S., and some host American military facilities.

These countries defend themselves using weapons like the U.S.-made Patriot and Israeli-made SPYDER interceptors. Drone experts from Ukraine now advise the defenders too.

For example, the UAE reported attacks by 1,835 drones, 378 ballistic missiles and 15 cruise missiles. As of March 10, it claimed to have intercepted 94 per cent of the drones and 99 per cent of the missiles.

The deadliness of these attacks has varied.

Continuing lethality

In Israel, Iranian missiles have killed 20 people, implying roughly 4.1 deaths per hundred missiles arriving.

That’s less than the 5.1 the country saw during its 2025 war with Iran. But it’s four to 40 times higher than the rates it suffered from rockets in earlier Gaza and Lebanon conflicts.

In the Persian Gulf, Iranian projectiles have killed at least 15 civilians, 13 U.S. soldiers and seven merchant sailors.

There were about 0.6 deaths per hundred Iranian attacks in Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE combined. That’s much lower than Israel’s rate, presumably because those countries were attacked by drones and short-range missiles carrying smaller warheads.

Interestingly, although the quantity of Iranian attacks fell after the first week, their lethality did not. Death rates per projectile in Arab countries showed little change week-to-week. In Israel, the rates were highest in Week 3.

In fact, Iranian missiles keep hitting precise targets, like U.S. military aircraft parked beside runways.

This implies Iran’s government has recovered from its initial surprise. It’s likely benefiting from Russian intelligence and Chinese technology too.

Tactical U.S. vs strategic Iran

So, U.S. and Israeli warplanes have bombed thousands of targets, killed thousands of civilians, and slowed Iran’s missile fire. But they haven’t stopped it.

That’s not surprising. Airstrikes alone didn’t stop rocket fire during Israel’s previous conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon. Ground invasions were needed for that.

U.S. President Donald Trump can post jingoistic mashup videos and “bullshit” about having “militarily won” the war in Iran. But he hasn’t achieved strategic outcomes like “unconditional surrender” from Iran or regime change there.

By contrast, Iran’s missiles have been strategically effective. They’ve damaged Persian Gulf refineries and halted tanker traffic. They’ve forced Trump to relax sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil, and on Belarusian fertilizer. And they’ve shown Arab monarchies that U.S. defence agreements have limited value.

Trump recently, and inadvertently, admitted this weakness. While discussing Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, he said “it would be great if we could do something, but they have to open it.”

This strategic failure despite tactical success is reminiscent of the Vietnam War. U.S. units had overwhelming firepower as they killed enemy soldiers. But body counts by themselves indicated little about strategic progress.

Some historians rank that war as the second worst U.S. foreign policy decision ever. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was ranked the worst.

Trump talks about being the greatest U.S. president in history. So, perhaps his Iran war will make him the new leader on that policy failure list.

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by John Duncan

The Iranian regime is certainly brutal. But it’s also powerful as it continues to project its might after a month of illegal air strikes by the United States and Israel.

Read more: Iran’s attacks drone on, with the U.S. at risk of losing the war

Iran is in the top 10 per cent of countries by size and population, has the third largest proven petroleum reserves and controls strategically crucial geography.

Furthermore, both the regime and many ordinary Iranians are prepared to defend the country. Since 1953, when the U.S. helped orchestrate a coup to overthrow Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, Iranians have understood they’re in America’s crosshairs.

This was especially true after the 1979 Islamic Revolution that overthrew the shah and during the U.S.-backed Iraq war against Iran that killed a million Iranians in the 1980s. As a result, Iran has spent decades beefing up and decentralizing its military capability.

In contrast, Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned U.S. President Donald Trump in February that the U.S. was short on both munitions and allied support for a war against Iran. Israel, America’s partner in war, is also short, especially in interceptor munitions. Trump and Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed the concerns, which suggests they planned a short war.

What are Trump’s options?

Critics have accused Trump of dragging the U.S. — or allowing it to be dragged — into a “forever war.” Those critics include those in his MAGA base, a problem for Trump as he anticipates November’s mid-term elections.

One unconventional option that might expedite victory, discussed during Trump’s first term, is to use nuclear weapons against Iran. Trump has said nukes won’t be used, but he’s well-known for erratic reversals.

A nuclear strike might expedite surrender, but it took two strikes on Japan in 1945 before the Japanese surrendered, and, failing an Iranian surrender, several strikes might be required to destroy the military capability distributed across Iran’s 31 provinces. Because many Americans would be appalled by a nuclear attack, putting the mid-terms at risk, the nuclear option is unlikely.

Much of the concern about Trump’s election machinations heading into the mid-terms is focused on the manipulation of procedures and officials. The legacy of the Jan. 6, 2021 attacks on the U.S. Capitol is one extreme possibility, as is manipulating the Iran war to achieve electoral gains.

Trump will probably lean into his rhetorical strengths and try to convince Americans the U.S. has won when it hasn’t. Claiming victory in the face of its absence is not new to him. Even in his second term, Trump continues to push the false claim that he won the 2020 election.

Consider the bizarre drama that started on March 21 when Trump and Iran exchanged dire threats. Then, out of the blue, Trump declared the existence of peace talks, which Iran denied. Perhaps they are imaginary talks on the way to an imaginary victory for Trump.

Read more: Why Donald Trump is such a relentless bullshitter

Mission accomplished?

It seems clear Trump is planning to declare victory well ahead of the mid-terms — and in part because of them. Such a strategy would involve baiting opponents into “forever war” criticisms, only to ridicule them in stump speeches, generating the image of a president who finishes his wars.

A declared victory in Iran and a timely exit, in addition to the liberation of Venezuela and a possible Cuban coup, might all coalesce into potent election messaging for the Republicans.

Soon enough, Trump may announce something akin to former president George W. Bush’s premature proclamations about the Iraq War in 2003 by saying something like this:

“Major combat operations in Iran have ended. The United States and Israel have prevailed. We do not know the day of final victory, but we have seen the turning of the tide.”

If successful, he will secure two more years “like nobody’s ever seen before” of Republican congressional dominance.

Major obstacles

The battle for November will feature a few competing narratives in the U.S. But there are four major hurdles for Trump in particular.

• Information: For voters to be convinced that Trump is a decisive crusader against evil rather than another “forever war” president, right-wing media must sell yet another big lie, mainstream media must continue to pull its punches and the Democrats must continue to flounder.
• Affordability crisis: Trump also has to ensure he doesn’t “win” in Iran while losing on affordability at home. Most American oil comes from the U.S., Canada and Mexico, so the U.S. is protected from global supply disruptions, but global markets push up prices everywhere. Trump’s mere declaration of talks recently brought oil prices down, but only temporarily.
• Allies needed: Because voters will want to see a significant military withdrawal, Trump needs other countries to manage the chaos he’s created. But after disrespecting allies for months, he is struggling to establish a “coalition of the willing” on which to offload the conflict.
• Iranians must co-operate: But because the U.S. and Israel have twice attacked Iran during diplomatic negotiations, Iran needs other stakeholders in the process. Without them, Iran will not be incentivized to stop fighting and nothing will belie an imaginary Trump victory more than ongoing Iranian attacks.

Democracy waning

Whichever scenario prevails, Americans will likely lose. Their complete war costs could include repercussions from the unprecedented illegal bombing of Iran, as well as from unnecessarily turning regional allies into targets.

All of this is tied to what many Americans regard as increasing Israeli aggression, including the killing of 70,000 people in Gaza, which the U.S. has facilitated with funding, political cover and its widely mocked Board of Peace.

America’s democracy, economy and credibility are waning as Trump shamelessly pursues self-aggrandizement and self-enrichment.

“That makes me smart,” he might say, but only a failed leader serves his own interests at the expense of his country.

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By Chris Bonasia

A Mi’kmaq community in southeastern New Brunswick is seeking proposals for microgrid projects that will cut emissions and reduce reliance on the province’s grid system.

The rural community of Amlamgog, also known as Fort Folly First Nation, has experienced multi-day power outages in the past, Kevin Woods, energy services director at the North Shore Mi’kmaq Tribal Council (NSMTC), said in an email to The Energy Mix. The council represents seven Member Nations in New Brunswick, including Amlamgog, which is working with Foresight Canada to launch a “microgrid challenge,” soliciting projects that propose cost-effective, scalable renewable energy technologies that enhance the community’s energy resilience, reduce its greenhouse gas emissions, and boost its economic self-determination.

Though grid connected, the geography and size of the Amlamgog community, which has approximately 140 registered members, “well support the establishment of a microgrid with embedded clean energy generation,” Woods said.

“The ultimate goal is to develop a community-led microgrid that enhances local energy security, ensures stable and affordable electricity, and sets an example for other Indigenous and remote communities across Canada,” Foresight said in a press release.

Amlamgog has already made efforts to build a resilient, low-emissions energy system that can function independently of the grid. In 2021, the First Nation installed solar panels on four of its commercial buildings with support from the federal government’s low-carbon economy fund. Last year an assessment showed that the community’s total electrical consumption in 2023 was roughly 50% lower than the New Brunswick average.

Applications for the microgrid challenge opened on March 13 and will close on April 25, with winners announced in May. An information webinar for applicants is scheduled for April 2.

Project proposals must integrate seamlessly with the existing network or a microgrid serving Amlamgog, and accommodate challenges linked to siting, feedstock logistics, and operating costs. Proposals will also be evaluated for their ability to reduce emissions and costs in comparison with using the provincial grid. Proposals that create a new revenue stream for the community, like selling excess power back into the grid, could be an advantage.

Asked if the council will be open to proposals that use fossil fuels—such as gas with carbon capture—Wood replied that “technologies that result in enhanced energy independence and lowering the community’s GHG emissions profile will be considered.”

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By Gergely Molnar, Energy Analyst – Natural Gas

The architecture of global gas supply security needs to be carefully reassessed

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 triggered the first truly global gas crisis, with natural gas and LNG markets contending with supply disruptions and unprecedented price volatility.

The gas crisis had broader implications on other energy commodities, including electricity with gas being the marginal price setter in many markets including heat, which remains heavily reliant on gas, and coal via gas-to-coal switching. Beyond the energy complex, the fertiliser sector was among the most impacted, due to its high exposure to natural gas prices, which in turn led to dramatic increases in the price of food.

The International Energy Agency (IEA) responded swiftly to the unfolding global energy crisis, by providing advice to policymakers through a 10-Point Plan on Reducing the European Union’s Reliance on Russian Gas just one week after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. An IEA Ministerial meeting on Gas Markets and Supply Security was held in February 2023 and a Task Force on Gas and Clean Fuels Market Monitoring and Supply and Security was set up.

While the immediate effects of the 2022/23 gas supply shock have eased and gas markets returned to growth in 2024, the structural changes which emerged in 2022 will persist for years. In this context, the architecture of global gas supply security needs to be carefully reassessed through a closer dialogue between responsible producers and consumers.

The 2022/23 gas supply shock transformed gas markets in a structural manner

Russia’s piped gas deliveries to Europe fell suddenly by almost 120 bcm through 2022-23, equating to around one-fifth of the global LNG market. This unprecedented gas supply shock not only drove up natural gas prices to all-time highs and necessitated a readjustment in natural gas demand, but fundamentally transformed the global gas market.

LNG effectively became a new baseload source of gas supply for Europe. Benefitting from the growing flexibility and liquidity of the global LNG market, Europe sharply increased its LNG imports, including from the United States amid the rapidly declining Russian piped gas flows: the share of LNG in the European Union’s gas demand rose from an average of 12% over the 2010s to above 35% since 2022 – a share similar to Russia’s piped gas before the invasion of Ukraine. As LNG flows were increasingly directed to Europe, price-sensitive buyers with high exposure to the spot market faced a deterioration in their gas and electricity supply security, with rotating power cuts introduced in Bangladesh and Pakistan amid the inadequacy of gas supplies.

The phase-out of Russian piped gas to Europe reduced supply flexibility. Besides the volumetric loss and difference in costs, Russian piped gas contracts included significant intra-annual and inter-annual flexibility, with the nomination rights ultimately lying with the buyers. This flexibility – underpinned by the country’s huge swing fields – played a key role in meeting short-term and seasonal variability in demand in Europe. This contributed to the balancing of European and global gas markets. It is estimated that the inter-annual flexibility provided by Russian piped gas averaged close to 10 bcm on an annual basis through the 2010s.

Europe’s role as a balancing market is set to decline, while China’s influence on global LNG flows is set to rise. Steep cuts in Russian gas supply reduced Europe’s ability to optimise between flexible piped gas flows and LNG imports and hence largely eroded Europe’s role as a balancing market. China’s role as a balancing market is expected to increase over the medium term, especially when considering the country’s active role in securing LNG contracts. Nevertheless, China is unlikely to have the same balancing role as Europe had in the past due to its limited underground storage capacity, less flexibility in piped import contracts and low liquidity of domestic gas hubs.

This structurally lower gas market flexibility means that other options, such as storage, LNG peak-shaving1 and demand response, will have to play a greater role in balancing the market in the coming years. In addition, a closer dialogue between producers and consumers should explore the development of innovative commercial offerings, new procurement mechanisms and co-operation frameworks favouring a more flexible supply of LNG. And while natural gas is expected to face different demand trajectories across regions, there is a continued need to assess how to ensure investment in gas infrastructure and the evolving nature and role of long-term contracts.

Moreover, the weather sensitivity of natural gas demand is expected to increase. Climate change is driving more extreme weather patterns. Cold spells and sizzling summer heat waves can increase gas and electricity demand in a sudden and unpredictable manner. In markets with a growing share of variable renewables, gas-based generation plays an increasingly important back-up role in ensuring electricity supply security. These changes might increase the variability of natural gas demand and hence necessitate greater gas supply flexibility.

Assessing flexibility options along gas and LNG value chains

The flexibility options available along gas and LNG value chains play a key role in ensuring the uninterrupted availability of natural gas at an affordable price. Flexibility mechanisms can be essentially divided into three distinct categories:

• Primary supply flexibility determines the overall volumes of natural gas which can be made available to a market. Upstream deliverability together with the availability of spare LNG liquefaction capacity and spare capacity on export pipelines determines whether the primary supply of natural gas can be increased. Typically, natural gas fields have limited variability in their production rates, except for a handful “swing fields”, which can ramp up and ramp down output to meet seasonal demand fluctuations. In certain markets, reducing gas flaring/venting could improve natural gas supply availability. Similarly, long-distance export pipelines and LNG liquefaction typically run close to their nameplate capacity. In 2023, the average utilisation rate of LNG export facilities was very high, near 90%.
• Midstream flexibility mechanisms ensure the timely and efficient allocation of natural gas and LNG among market participants. LNG shipments -when underpinned by destination-free contracts- are a key contributor to midstream flexibility and the growing liquidity of the global LNG market. Underground storage facilities play a key role in meeting seasonal demand swings. Short-term demand variability is typically met by fast-cycling salt caverns, floating LNG storage, peak-shaving LNG plants and linepack in transmission systems, in addition to the flexibility included in the contracts.
• Demand-side flexibility options can temporarily reduce natural gas demand via market-based mechanisms and/or administrated measures. This includes fuel-switching capabilities in the power and industrial sectors, demand auction systems, awareness-raising campaigns incentivising behavioural changes and administrative gas demand restrictions. In markets phasing out coal-based generation, fuel-switching might become more limited over time. Administrative measures are typically introduced in a manner that first non-protected consumers (e.g. industries) reduce their consumption in order to secure gas deliveries to protected consumers (e.g. households, hospitals).

All these flexibility mechanisms played a crucial role in mitigating the impact of the 2022/23 gas supply shock. However, the crisis has also demonstrated the need to further enhance flexibility options along the gas and LNG value chains in order to improve the resilience of the global gas market.

More stringent storage regulations have been adopted across key markets since 2022

The 2022/23 gas supply shock put natural gas storage regulation in the spotlight as import markets aim to reinforce the resilience and deliverability of their respective gas systems. Those regulations relate both to physical and virtual storage options.2

Singapore introduced a standby LNG facility at the end of 2021 and in June 2022 the Energy Market Authority extended it until 31 March 2023 to address the risk of gas supply disruptions.

The European Union adopted a new Gas Storage Regulation at the end of June 2022 with a target storage fill level of 80% of capacity before the winter of 2022/23, and 90% ahead of all following winter periods. Under the current regulation, storage capacity filling obligations will come to an end on 31 December 2025.

Australia implemented the East Coast Gas System Framework in May 2023 in response to the significant challenges experienced across east coast gas markets. The new framework provides the regulator with additional powers, including to purchase services provided by a storage provider.

Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) has launched the Strategic Buffer LNG (SBL) since  2023/24 focusing on winter season. Under this system, METI designates private operators with additional LNG procurement capacity as companies authorised to handle SBL operations. In the event of a contingency that could hinder LNG supply, the government instructs the designated companies to sell their LNG cargoes to utilities in Japan facing the risk of supply disruption. The government will compensate the designated operator for any losses and operational costs caused by the instructed trade. JERA was designated as the first supplier under Japan’s SBL in November 2023.

International co-operation can enhance flexibility mechanisms along gas and LNG value chains

The measures undertaken by governments and regulatory agencies since the beginning of the 2022/23 gas supply shock were key to mitigate the impact of the crisis and to strengthen the resilience of their respective markets. These policies and regulatory measures followed a national or regional approach due to the nature of natural gas markets.

In an increasingly globalised gas market, however, storage regulations can have extra-regional implications. This calls for closer international dialogue and improved transparency on measures related to gas reserve mechanisms. The International Energy Agency will provide a regular update on natural gas storage and its evolving regulatory frameworks across key markets. A first overview of storage regulations was provided in the IEA’s Global Gas Security Review 2023 edition. Measures improving the transparency of natural gas and LNG inventory levels should be also considered.

Regional import markets have become increasingly interconnected due to the growing share of destination-flexible LNG. While this adds a layer of security during supply-demand shocks for the worst-affected countries, it also means that shocks originating in one market can have implications for other regions. This is clearly demonstrated by the relatively high correlation between regional spot prices through the last decade, for instance between northwest Europe and northeast Asia.

In this context, there is a need to complement national and regional initiatives with a closer international co-operation on global gas supply security. Reinforcing flexibility mechanisms and options along gas and LNG value chains will require co-operation between responsible producers and consumers on several issues, including:

• Improving the liquidity of the global LNG market: the growing flexibility and liquidity of the global LNG market was crucial in the response to the gas supply shock of 2022. According to the IEA’s internal LNG contract database, the share of destination-free LNG contracts rose from 30% in 2016 to 47% in 2023 and is expected to increase to 52% by 2027 as existing destination-fixed contracts expire, while new destination-flexible contracts enter into force. Intergovernmental agreements can accelerate this process by eliminating/relaxing existing destination inflexibility and/or ease regulations related to reloading. The LNG reserve co-operation agreement between Japan and Thailand is a recent example of international efforts to improve regional gas supply security taking advantage of improved destination flexibility. Wider use of flexible commercial solutions, such as LNG contracts with cancellation clauses and/or with seasonal flexibility options can further enhance the liquidity of the global LNG market. More flexible primary LNG contracts could also improve the depth and the liquidity of the spot LNG market.
• Enhance the availability and deliverability of underground gas storage by integrating the Ukrainian gas storage system in the European and global gas market: Ukraine’s vast natural gas storage capacity (~30 bcm) can significantly contribute to European and global gas supply security, especially in the context of Europe’s greater reliance on the global LNG market. In 2023, Ukrtransgaz, the storage system operator, underwent successful certification in line with the European Union’s Storage Regulation. Ukraine is offering up to 10 bcm of storage capacity to European market players. Besides European traders, this storage capacity could be marketed to global LNG players, including to those with a growing exposure in Central and Eastern Europe.
• Voluntary gas reserves mechanisms: carefully crafted gas reserves mechanisms (either physical or virtual) can contribute to greater gas supply security and price stability. The IEA will host a series of workshops to assess the modalities of gas reserve mechanisms. Building on an extensive consultation process, the IEA will provide an analysis on potential frameworks for voluntary gas reserve mechanisms presented in a special Report.

The International Energy Agency stands ready to support its governments and partners in strengthening flexibility mechanisms along gas and LNG value chains. Recognising the crucial role of gas storage for gas supply security and market stability, the IEA developed a Gas Reserve Programme with the support of the Government of Japan.

The 13^th LNG Producer-Consumer Conference – co-hosted by the International Energy Agency and Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and on 6 October 2024 in Hiroshima- will provide a platform for the public and private sectors to discuss gas supply security.

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New IEA report offers first-of-its-kind global inventory of the policies countries are leveraging to advance clean energy transitions and improve energy security

Government support and incentives for clean energy technologies have reached new highs as policymakers place renewed focus on energy security in the wake of multiple crises in recent years, according to a new IEA report.

The first edition of the report – State of Energy Policy 2024 – provides the most comprehensive and up-to-date global picture of energy policies by country and sector, highlighting the most substantial changes in the past 12 months. This includes a publicly available repository – the Energy Policy Inventory – which contains over 5 000 energy-related policies worldwide across areas such as government spending, regulation and trade.

The inaugural edition shows that governments around the world have earmarked almost $2 trillion in direct investment support for clean energy since 2020. This is almost triple the amount committed following the 2007-08 financial crisis. The report finds that around 80 per cent of direct government spending allocated was in China, the European Union and the United States.

Domestic manufacturing incentives for clean energy are one area of public investment that continues to grow substantially, accounting for almost 10 per cent of total government spending since the beginning of the decade, with low-emissions vehicles, hydrogen and batteries receiving the largest allocations, according to the report. High-profile examples include the United States’ Inflation Reduction Act, India’s Production-Linked Incentive and Brazil’s Green Mobility and Innovation Programme with other countries introducing similar policies and targets.

At the consumer level, the report finds that the cost of short-term government support totalled $940 billion at the height of the global energy crisis. While many emergency measures have been eased, government-led programmes to address issues of ongoing affordability and competitiveness remain in place, particularly to address the upfront costs of adopting clean energy technologies.

“The unprecedented level of policy and investment support for clean energy is a recognition that these technologies not only reduce emissions but help safeguard energy security,” saidLaura Cozzi, IEA Director of Sustainability, Technology and Outlooks. “The increase in trade policies and domestic manufacturing incentives also signals that clean energy is becoming central in industrial policies.”

With high geographical concentrations within clean energy supply chains – across technologies such as solar PV, wind, batteries and electrolyzers – the new report notes an increased policy focus on supporting home-grown manufacturing and supply chain security. This is reflected by a dramatic jump in the number of trade policies related to clean energy technologies, with nearly 200 new trade measures introduced since 2020, compared with less than 40 in the preceding five years. Import tariff adjustments, anti-dumping duties and offsetting measures, including those recently announced by the European Union and the United States, account for almost 40 per cent of clean energy trade policy changes since 2020.

Energy performance standards are another area where policy intervention has grown significantly in recent years. In 2023 alone, 35 countries – representing 20 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions – passed new energy performance regulations. However, some countries have also rolled back regulations, such as banning the sale of new fossil fuel boilers and internal combustion engine vehicles, and on the phase-out of unabated coal. These rollbacks affected around 1 per cent of current global emissions and were outweighed by increased stringency in other parts of the world.

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By Lori Aniti, Glenn McGrath, Kimberly Peterson 

On April 8, 2024, a total solar eclipse briefly but fully obscured sunlight to utility-scale solar electric generation facilities along the eclipse’s path, from Texas through Maine. Texas was especially affected because of how much solar capacity was in the path of totality.

• According to our Hourly Electric Grid Monitor, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), which is the primary balancing authority in the state, lost approximately 8.9 gigawatts (GW) of solar capacity during the eclipse.
• The ERCOT five-minute generation data show solar generation fell starting at 12:20 p.m. central time (CT). The eclipse ended in Texas at 3:07 p.m. CT.
• Like the rest of the country, natural gas-fired generation largely offset the lost solar generation in ERCOT, replacing approximately 80% of the lost solar on April 8. According to EIA’s Hourly Electric Grid Monitor, which measures the grid response over a broader time interval than the data pulled directly from ERCOT, natural gas-fired power plants generated an additional 6.2 GW on April 8 between 1 p.m. CT and 2 p.m. CT, the hour when totality took place, to replace the lost solar generation. Coal and other sources—mostly battery storage—each produced an additional 0.8 GW to offset the loss.
• In Texas, solar generation is often the second-leading energy source in ERCOT during the time of day the eclipse crossed the state behind natural gas.
• In ERCOT, throughout the day, Texas saw less solar generation on April 8 than on April 7, with cloud cover that persisted through April 9.

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By Mitchell Beer

Two gas-fired power plants going offline and a winter deep freeze were enough to trigger an emergency alert on the Alberta power grid last Friday and Saturday, prompting at least two provincial premiers to blame the shortfall on the wind and solar generation that eventually helped bring some relief to the system.

On Friday, University of Alberta energy economist Andrew Leach reported a “day of chaos in energy markets in Western Canada,” after “a vicious cold snap… ravaged gas and electricity markets.” With natural gas markets facing supply issues due to plant freeze-ups combined with high heating demand, a grid alert from the Alberta Electricity System Operator (AESO) indicated “very thin margins of error,” with the provincial grid just barely able to maintain any reserve capacity through 11 PM that day.

“Let’s hope for no more plant outages,” Leach wrote in his Energy Charts newsletter. “With the H.R. Milner (300 megawatts) and Sundance 6 (401 MW) natural gas plants offline, and almost no wind and no solar generation this evening, the AESO are asking for conservation and, you’d have to think, hoping it gets a bit windier.”

But there were more tense moments ahead. On Saturday night, the AESO had to issue an emergency alert asking households to conserve power to avert a “high risk” of rotating power outages, CBC wrote. That meant turning off unnecessary lights and appliances, minimizing use of electric space heaters, avoid cooking with a stove, and delaying plugging in electric vehicles or block heaters.

Before that alert, the grid was down to its last 10 megawatts of reserve power, CBC said, citing the grid operator’s supply/demand report. Afterwards demand fell by 100 MW within seconds, an AESO spokesperson said, and by 7:45 PM local time, the province had a more comfortable reserve of 404 MW on hand.

At 6 PM, the province’s hourly demand had hit a record 12,384, before dialling back to 11,187 MW less than two hours later.

“On behalf of the AESO, I would like to extend my thanks to all Albertans who responded to the call for action,” AESO President and CEO Mike Law said in a release.

While the rest of the province breathed a sigh of relief, CBC said the Siksika Nation east of Calgary was still in a state of local emergency, after a gas line outage left more than 50 households without heat.

One Alert, Many Causes

At the height of the alerts, Alberta was importing limited supplies of electricity from Saskatchewan, British Columbia, and Montana, with the two provincial governments delivering decidedly different messages at a moment of crisis.

“SaskPower is providing 153 MW of electricity to [Alberta] this evening to assist them through this shortage,” Saskatchewan Premier Scott Moe posted on social media. “That power will be coming from natural gas and coal-fired plants, the ones the Trudeau government is telling us to shut down (which we won’t).”

“Extreme weather events like drought and cold snaps are putting people and communities at increased risk,” said Josie Osborne, B.C.’s minister of energy, mines and low carbon innovation, whose province sent 200 MW across the border. “Thanks to the resiliency of our energy system and exceptional planning by BC Hydro, we are able to meet the needs of British Columbians while also delivering clean, reliable hydroelectricity to our neighbours in Alberta when they needed it most.”

In the aftermath, Leach told CBC the episode had many root causes, but also showed the need for more flexibility as the federal government moves to decarbonize the country’s power grids by 2035.

“You had, for much of Alberta, the coldest night in 50 years, you had… a particularly acute low wind event, and last night a lack of import availability because of a lot of pressures on the Saskatchewan grid and on the B.C. grid at the same time as we were facing pressures,” he said. “Add to that the unexpected outage of a gas plant. That alone puts you there.”

Earlier this month, a report by the Union of Concerned Scientists warned that gas plants are more prone to failure in extreme weather events, including heatwaves, cold snaps, and droughts, than utilities or the gas lobby have been inclined to admit.

Leach affirmed that the Canadian and U.S. grids can make the switch to largely renewable systems without compromising reliability, but said he understood the impulse to push back on the federal Clean Electricity Regulations.

“That presents a really big challenge and I think people have been too quick to wave that away,” he said.

Politicizing the Response

But that nuanced view of the provincial grid wasn’t very much in evidence in Alberta politicians’ immediate response to the emergency alert. “Right now, wind is generating almost no power,” Alberta Premier Danielle Smith posted. “When renewables are unreliable, as they are now, natural gas plants must increase capacity to keep Albertans safe.”

Calgary MP Michelle Rempel Garner added that “if the electric system is already buckling under pressure, it won’t likely be able to handle ‘further extreme demand created by Liberal regulations’,” The Canadian Press reported.

But by then, CP wrote, the AESO had “partially pinned the crisis on two natural gas generators that weren’t operating, as well as a lack of renewable energy being produced due to low winds and a shortage of daylight at this time of year.” Data posted by Leach showed solar and wind capacity down by 8,130 MW, gas by about 2,600, but in the same newsletter he referred to two gas plants totalling 7,000 MW that were offline.

in an emailed statement to CP, a spokesperson for Environment and Climate Minister Steven Guilbeault stated that “reliability, along with affordability, is one of the driving forces behind how the regulations will be designed.”

The Clean Electricity Regulations “would never put the province in a situation where they did not have a reliable baseload,” the statement added, “and it is why we are making provisions so that fossil fuel burning plants can run without carbon capture technologies during peak usage or in situations of emergency.”

Leach told CP the issue shouldn’t be framed as an either/or between gas and renewables, arguing that “there needs to be a mix of energy sources, including better tie-ins with other jurisdictions,” the news agency wrote. “Modellers know there will be days when demand will be high and generation from renewables is low, he said. Planning for backup needs to happen in advance, he noted, and it’s the system operator’s job to do that.”

Renewables to the Rescue

In the end, the provincial grid evened out “as increasing wind and solar generation have created some relief on the system,” the AESO posted on social media late Monday morning. “Please continue conservation efforts during peak hours of 4-7 p.m. as extreme cold continues to challenge all of us in Western Canada.”

The Canadian Renewable Energy Association said the cold snap had Alberta “leaning on electricity generation capacity that has risen sharply over the past 12 months,” adding that the supply of renewables boded well for future power exports from the province. And on iPolitics, two veteran energy analysts took issue with Smith playing on a wicked cold snap to play politics.

“To say that the renewables are unreliable, I think that’s more of a political statement,” said Sara Hastings-Simon, a professor at the University of Calgary’s School of Public Policy. “I would say renewables weren’t generating, but whether that’s part of the problem, I guess it depends on what one says the problem is.”

The provincial grid “has to be designed and made up of a set of resources that are going to be able to meet demand at its peak and meet demand at its most stressed times,” she added. “You do that through a combination of resources, certainly looking forward with a goal of decarbonization.”

Hastings-Simon pointed to grid-connected batteries as a cleaner option to meet surging electricity demand, noting that “you can definitely see the value of energy storage” in the way the Alberta grid recovered. “It’s a great resource to be investing in because it can be built quickly, and we know it’s compatible with the direction of our future energy systems and wanting to get to a more highly decarbonized grid,” she said.

Ivey Foundation President Bruce Lourie said it was no surprise that solar wasn’t generating at night, or that wind speeds were down in very low temperatures. But “there are utilities all over the world that have lots of wind and manage for it, and there’s utilities all over the world have no gas and manage for it,” he told iPolitics.

“The Alberta electricity system is still heavily reliant on natural gas, it’s the largest component of electricity production, so really, if you’re looking at the near term, it does make sense for Alberta to have natural gas backup to renewable power,” he added. “But it’s got nothing to do with the reliability of new renewable power, and it’s got nothing to do with the ability to increase the amount of renewable power in Alberta. The idea that you need gas and you can’t have wind is not accurate.”

The real root of the problem, Lourie said, was an entirely deregulated provincial grid, the only one in Canada, with only limited interties to neighbouring jurisdictions. That analysis echoed the experience in Texas three years ago when about 700 people died, half of the state was under a boil water order, and racialized communities bore the brunt after climate change-driven severe weather imperiled the state’s islanded grid.

The entire system “was ‘seconds and minutes’ away from a catastrophic failure that could have left Texans in the dark for months,” the Texas Tribune reported at the time, citing officials from the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). While state politicians were quick to blame the crisis on wind power, just as the Alberta and Saskatchewan premiers were over the last week, most of the power plants brought down by the extreme cold in Texas were gas-fired.

A ‘Learning Experience’

After the alerts ended, Alberta Affordability and Utilities Minister Nathan Neudorf maintained the province had done all it could to prepare for the surge in demand. That was not quite six months after he and Smith slapped a seven-month moratorium on new renewable energy projects over a megawatt in size, affecting up to 118 projects worth C$33 billion and endangering investor confidence in a province that had been leading Canada in solar and wind deployment.

Instead, Alberta has more than 2,700 MW of new gas capacity coming online this year, the Globe and Mail reported last month.

On Monday, Neudorf said the series of grid alerts “was a learning experience,” adding that “hopefully, we won’t have that experience again.”

But Alberta has now had 21 grid alerts since 2017, CBC reported, four of them between Friday and Monday. Neudorf said he had ordered a review of the electricity system because Smith’s United Conservative Party (UCP) government foresaw more supply gaps in the future. But that was years after the previous NDP government adopted the AESO’s recommendation in 2016 that Alberta establish a capacity market that would pay power producers to keep more generation on standby. The UCP cancelled that plan when it took power in 2019, CBC writes.

University of Calgary associate professor of economics Blake Shaffer said he wasn’t sure a capacity market would have made much difference during extreme cold conditions, telling CBC the system might actually be the right size given that brownouts were averted. “If it had been too easy during the absolute record-breaking time period, while that might be comfortable, that’s not without its costs,” he said.

Leach compared a capacity market to “the firefighter model—I want infrastructure, I want capacity there when I need it. I’m going to pay for it to be on standby.” He said the approach “might have led to there being more resources available in total in the market before last weekend,” depending on how the market was designed.

More Vulnerability Everywhere

On Wednesday, Electricity Canada CEO Francis Bradley said there’s virtually no part of Canada where the grid isn’t vulnerable to longer periods of more severe weather conditions brought on by climate change.

“Over the last two years or so, during these extremes of weather, we’ve seen new peaks hit in terms of electricity demand,” Bradley told CP. “And it’s not just in Alberta. We saw new peak demands hit last summer in Ontario, we saw new peak demand hit last winter in Quebec, for example. In most regions of the country, the extremes are increasing.”

And in that kind of moment, former lawyer and energy executive Susan Jane Wright wrote for The Tyee, heeding the warning is a far better strategy than trying to score political points.

“Let’s not blame anyone. Let’s acknowledge that we had a close call on Saturday and spewing misinformation is not helpful; it’s downright dangerous,” Wright advised.

“Why? Because these kinds of power shortages will happen with more frequency as we move deeper into climate change. We can expect more days of extreme cold and extreme heat, which will drive up demand and put even more pressure on the power grid.”

Which means “we need to be prepared, not angry. We need answers, not ideological bozos spreading misinformation.”

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The energy world is at the dawn of a new industrial age – the age of clean energy technology manufacturing – that is creating major new markets and millions of jobs but also raising new risks, prompting countries across the globe to devise industrial strategies to secure their place in the new global energy economy, according to a major new IEA report.

Energy Technology Perspectives 2023, the latest instalment in one of the IEA’s flagship series, serves as the world’s first global guidebook for the clean technology industries of the future. It provides a comprehensive analysis of global manufacturing of clean energy technologies today – such as solar panels, wind turbines, EV batteries, electrolyzers for hydrogen and heat pumps – and their supply chains around the world, as well as mapping out how they are likely to evolve as the clean energy transition advances in the years ahead.

The analysis shows the global market for key mass-manufactured clean energy technologies will be worth around USD 650 billion a year by 2030 – more than three times today’s level – if countries worldwide fully implement their announced energy and climate pledges. The related clean energy manufacturing jobs would more than double from 6 million today to nearly 14 million by 2030 – and further rapid industrial and employment growth is expected in the following decades as transitions progress.

At the same time, the current supply chains of clean energy technologies present risks in the form of high geographic concentrations of resource mining and processing as well as technology manufacturing. For technologies like solar panels, wind, EV batteries, electrolyzers and heat pumps, the three largest producer countries account for at least 70 per cent of manufacturing capacity for each technology – with China dominant in all of them. Meanwhile, a great deal of the mining for critical minerals is concentrated in a small number of countries. For example, the Democratic Republic of Congo produces over 70 per cent of the world’s cobalt, and just three countries – Australia, Chile and China – account for more than 90 per cent of global lithium production.

The world is already seeing the risks of tight supply chains, which have pushed up clean energy technology prices in recent years, making countries’ clean energy transitions more difficult and costly. Increasing prices for cobalt, lithium and nickel led to the first ever rise in EV battery prices, which jumped by nearly 10 per cent globally in 2022. The cost of wind turbines outside China has also been rising after years of declines, and similar trends can be seen in solar PV.

“The IEA highlighted almost two years ago that a new global energy economy was emerging rapidly. Today, it has become a central pillar of economic strategy and every country needs to identify how it can benefit from the opportunities and navigate the challenges. We’re talking about new clean energy technology markets worth hundreds of billions of dollars as well as millions of new jobs,” said IEA Executive Director Fatih Birol. “The encouraging news is the global project pipeline for clean energy technology manufacturing is large and growing. If everything announced as of today gets built, the investment flowing into manufacturing clean energy technologies would provide two-thirds of what is needed in a pathway to net zero emissions. The current momentum is moving us closer to meeting our international energy and climate goals – and there is almost certainly more to come.”

“At the same time, the world would benefit from more diversified clean technology supply chains,” Dr Birol added. “As we have seen with Europe’s reliance on Russian gas, when you depend too much on one company, one country or one trade route – you risk paying a heavy price if there is disruption. So, I’m pleased to see many economies around the world competing today to be leaders in the new energy economy and drive an expansion of clean technology manufacturing in the race to net zero. It’s important, though, that this competition is fair – and that there is a healthy degree of international collaboration, since no country is an energy island and energy transitions will be more costly and slow if countries do not work together.”

The report notes that major economies are acting to combine their climate, energy security and industrial policies into broader strategies for their economies. The Inflation Reduction Act in the United States is a clear example of this, but there is also the Fit for 55 package and REPowerEU plan in the European Union, Japan’s Green Transformation programme, and the Production Linked Incentive scheme in India that encourages manufacturing of solar PV and batteries – and China is working to meet and even exceed the goals of its latest Five-Year Plan.

Meanwhile, clean energy project developers and investors are watching closely for the policies that can give them a competitive edge. Relatively short lead times of around 1-3 years on average to bring manufacturing facilities online mean that the project pipeline can expand rapidly in an environment that is conducive to investment. Only 25 per cent of the announced manufacturing projects globally for solar PV are under construction or beginning construction imminently, according to the report. The number is around 35 per cent for EV batteries and less than 10 per cent for electrolyzers. Government policies and market developments can have a significant effect on where the rest of these projects end up.

Amid the regional ambitions for scaling up manufacturing, ETP-2023 underscores the important role of international trade in clean energy technology supply chains. It shows that nearly 60 per cent of solar PV modules produced worldwide are traded across borders. Trade is also important for EV batteries and wind turbine components, despite their bulkiness, with China the main net exporter today.

The report also highlights the specific challenges related to the critical minerals needed for many clean energy technologies, noting the long lead times for developing new mines and the need for strong environmental, social and governance standards. Given the uneven geographic distribution of critical mineral resources, international collaboration and strategic partnerships will be crucial for ensuring security of supply.

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