By Michael J. Armstrong

The United States and Israel have repeatedly boasted about airstrikes in their current war with Iran. In Week 1, they claimed the destruction of 75 per cent of Iran’s missile launchers. By Week 2, they had reduced Iranian missile fire by 90 per cent and said the war was “already won in many ways.”

And yet, Iran keeps damaging refineries and blocking tankers from crossing the Strait of Hormuz.

The country has certainly suffered many tactical losses. But its missiles and drones have been strategically successful.

Iran so far has launched at least 5,400 such projectiles. Surprisingly, less than a tenth of them have targeted Israel, its traditional rival.

Missiles over Israel

Israel faced about 450 Iranian missile attacks during the war’s first four weeks. The rate of fire fell rapidly after the first weekend but has never halted.

Some missiles carry several hundred kilograms of explosives, enough to destroy an entire building. The rest instead dispense dozens of cluster bombs over wide areas. Those are less powerful but still lethal.

Israel’s long-range Arrow interceptors engage the missiles first. Its mid-range David’s Sling and short-range Iron Dome interceptors provide backup. (The country’s Iron Beam lasers are not being used.) Together, they’ve reportedly intercepted 92 per cent of incoming missiles.

But interceptors sometimes miss. And their supply is limited. Consequently, at least nine large warheads and 150 cluster bombs have hit populated areas.

These numbers imply that almost all Iranian missiles are accurate enough to need interception. By contrast, during Israel’s earlier conflicts with Gaza in 2008, 2011 and 2014, less than a third of incoming rockets were so accurate.

Meanwhile, more than 90 per cent of Iran’s missiles and drones have targeted Arab countries in the Persian Gulf.

Drones across the Persian Gulf

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) collectively reported around 4,900 Iranian attacks during the first four weeks. Only one fifth were missiles: the rest were drones.

These countries have stated they are neutral in the war. However, they do have defence agreements with the U.S., and some host American military facilities.

These countries defend themselves using weapons like the U.S.-made Patriot and Israeli-made SPYDER interceptors. Drone experts from Ukraine now advise the defenders too.

For example, the UAE reported attacks by 1,835 drones, 378 ballistic missiles and 15 cruise missiles. As of March 10, it claimed to have intercepted 94 per cent of the drones and 99 per cent of the missiles.

The deadliness of these attacks has varied.

Continuing lethality

In Israel, Iranian missiles have killed 20 people, implying roughly 4.1 deaths per hundred missiles arriving.

That’s less than the 5.1 the country saw during its 2025 war with Iran. But it’s four to 40 times higher than the rates it suffered from rockets in earlier Gaza and Lebanon conflicts.

In the Persian Gulf, Iranian projectiles have killed at least 15 civilians, 13 U.S. soldiers and seven merchant sailors.

There were about 0.6 deaths per hundred Iranian attacks in Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE combined. That’s much lower than Israel’s rate, presumably because those countries were attacked by drones and short-range missiles carrying smaller warheads.

Interestingly, although the quantity of Iranian attacks fell after the first week, their lethality did not. Death rates per projectile in Arab countries showed little change week-to-week. In Israel, the rates were highest in Week 3.

In fact, Iranian missiles keep hitting precise targets, like U.S. military aircraft parked beside runways.

This implies Iran’s government has recovered from its initial surprise. It’s likely benefiting from Russian intelligence and Chinese technology too.

Tactical U.S. vs strategic Iran

So, U.S. and Israeli warplanes have bombed thousands of targets, killed thousands of civilians, and slowed Iran’s missile fire. But they haven’t stopped it.

That’s not surprising. Airstrikes alone didn’t stop rocket fire during Israel’s previous conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon. Ground invasions were needed for that.

U.S. President Donald Trump can post jingoistic mashup videos and “bullshit” about having “militarily won” the war in Iran. But he hasn’t achieved strategic outcomes like “unconditional surrender” from Iran or regime change there.

By contrast, Iran’s missiles have been strategically effective. They’ve damaged Persian Gulf refineries and halted tanker traffic. They’ve forced Trump to relax sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil, and on Belarusian fertilizer. And they’ve shown Arab monarchies that U.S. defence agreements have limited value.

Trump recently, and inadvertently, admitted this weakness. While discussing Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, he said “it would be great if we could do something, but they have to open it.”

This strategic failure despite tactical success is reminiscent of the Vietnam War. U.S. units had overwhelming firepower as they killed enemy soldiers. But body counts by themselves indicated little about strategic progress.

Some historians rank that war as the second worst U.S. foreign policy decision ever. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was ranked the worst.

Trump talks about being the greatest U.S. president in history. So, perhaps his Iran war will make him the new leader on that policy failure list.

The post Iran’s attacks drone on, with the U.S. at risk of losing the war appeared first on Thoughtful Journalism About Energy's Future.

by John Duncan

The Iranian regime is certainly brutal. But it’s also powerful as it continues to project its might after a month of illegal air strikes by the United States and Israel.

Read more: Iran’s attacks drone on, with the U.S. at risk of losing the war

Iran is in the top 10 per cent of countries by size and population, has the third largest proven petroleum reserves and controls strategically crucial geography.

Furthermore, both the regime and many ordinary Iranians are prepared to defend the country. Since 1953, when the U.S. helped orchestrate a coup to overthrow Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, Iranians have understood they’re in America’s crosshairs.

This was especially true after the 1979 Islamic Revolution that overthrew the shah and during the U.S.-backed Iraq war against Iran that killed a million Iranians in the 1980s. As a result, Iran has spent decades beefing up and decentralizing its military capability.

In contrast, Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned U.S. President Donald Trump in February that the U.S. was short on both munitions and allied support for a war against Iran. Israel, America’s partner in war, is also short, especially in interceptor munitions. Trump and Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed the concerns, which suggests they planned a short war.

What are Trump’s options?

Critics have accused Trump of dragging the U.S. — or allowing it to be dragged — into a “forever war.” Those critics include those in his MAGA base, a problem for Trump as he anticipates November’s mid-term elections.

One unconventional option that might expedite victory, discussed during Trump’s first term, is to use nuclear weapons against Iran. Trump has said nukes won’t be used, but he’s well-known for erratic reversals.

A nuclear strike might expedite surrender, but it took two strikes on Japan in 1945 before the Japanese surrendered, and, failing an Iranian surrender, several strikes might be required to destroy the military capability distributed across Iran’s 31 provinces. Because many Americans would be appalled by a nuclear attack, putting the mid-terms at risk, the nuclear option is unlikely.

Much of the concern about Trump’s election machinations heading into the mid-terms is focused on the manipulation of procedures and officials. The legacy of the Jan. 6, 2021 attacks on the U.S. Capitol is one extreme possibility, as is manipulating the Iran war to achieve electoral gains.

Trump will probably lean into his rhetorical strengths and try to convince Americans the U.S. has won when it hasn’t. Claiming victory in the face of its absence is not new to him. Even in his second term, Trump continues to push the false claim that he won the 2020 election.

Consider the bizarre drama that started on March 21 when Trump and Iran exchanged dire threats. Then, out of the blue, Trump declared the existence of peace talks, which Iran denied. Perhaps they are imaginary talks on the way to an imaginary victory for Trump.

Read more: Why Donald Trump is such a relentless bullshitter

Mission accomplished?

It seems clear Trump is planning to declare victory well ahead of the mid-terms — and in part because of them. Such a strategy would involve baiting opponents into “forever war” criticisms, only to ridicule them in stump speeches, generating the image of a president who finishes his wars.

A declared victory in Iran and a timely exit, in addition to the liberation of Venezuela and a possible Cuban coup, might all coalesce into potent election messaging for the Republicans.

Soon enough, Trump may announce something akin to former president George W. Bush’s premature proclamations about the Iraq War in 2003 by saying something like this:

“Major combat operations in Iran have ended. The United States and Israel have prevailed. We do not know the day of final victory, but we have seen the turning of the tide.”

If successful, he will secure two more years “like nobody’s ever seen before” of Republican congressional dominance.

Major obstacles

The battle for November will feature a few competing narratives in the U.S. But there are four major hurdles for Trump in particular.

• Information: For voters to be convinced that Trump is a decisive crusader against evil rather than another “forever war” president, right-wing media must sell yet another big lie, mainstream media must continue to pull its punches and the Democrats must continue to flounder.
• Affordability crisis: Trump also has to ensure he doesn’t “win” in Iran while losing on affordability at home. Most American oil comes from the U.S., Canada and Mexico, so the U.S. is protected from global supply disruptions, but global markets push up prices everywhere. Trump’s mere declaration of talks recently brought oil prices down, but only temporarily.
• Allies needed: Because voters will want to see a significant military withdrawal, Trump needs other countries to manage the chaos he’s created. But after disrespecting allies for months, he is struggling to establish a “coalition of the willing” on which to offload the conflict.
• Iranians must co-operate: But because the U.S. and Israel have twice attacked Iran during diplomatic negotiations, Iran needs other stakeholders in the process. Without them, Iran will not be incentivized to stop fighting and nothing will belie an imaginary Trump victory more than ongoing Iranian attacks.

Democracy waning

Whichever scenario prevails, Americans will likely lose. Their complete war costs could include repercussions from the unprecedented illegal bombing of Iran, as well as from unnecessarily turning regional allies into targets.

All of this is tied to what many Americans regard as increasing Israeli aggression, including the killing of 70,000 people in Gaza, which the U.S. has facilitated with funding, political cover and its widely mocked Board of Peace.

America’s democracy, economy and credibility are waning as Trump shamelessly pursues self-aggrandizement and self-enrichment.

“That makes me smart,” he might say, but only a failed leader serves his own interests at the expense of his country.

The post Why Donald Trump will try to declare victory in Iran well before November appeared first on Thoughtful Journalism About Energy's Future.

Iran can boost oil prices to $200 just by partially blocking the Strait of Hormuz

By Ed Hirs

This article was published by Forbes Magazine on July 25, 2018.

The latest saber rattling from and about Iran gives new resonance to talk of $200 oil. Iran can do it with just a partial blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.

Reuters recently detailed past Iranian military operations that could interrupt the oil supplies passing through the Strait of Hormuz: 18 million barrels of oil per day, or about 20 per cent of the world’s supply. How do we get to $200+ per barrel? An economic analysis is required.

‘Crude Oil Imports and National Security’ estimates -0.04 for the price elasticity of demand for crude oil. That is, if quantity supplied to the market is cut by 10 per cent, the price of oil will increase by 250 per cent. With oil currently at $70 per barrel, a disruption in shipping in the Strait of Hormuz would lead to a $175 a barrel price increase, for a total of $245 per barrel, as shown in the graph.

President Trump is correct that the United States has paid a lot of money for the defense of oil interests in the Middle East.

The Cost of War Project at Brown University now estimates the costs of wars since 9/11 at $5.6 trillion. To this needs to be added the military casualties of 6,961 dead and 52,682 wounded.

President Eisenhower avoided the trap that has ensnared three consecutive U.S. administrations. He rejected the pleas from Britain, France and Israel to enter the Suez Crisis in 1956.

Understanding that conflicts in the Middle East were about who owned the oil and largess from its production, the pragmatic President Eisenhower realized that consuming nations would buy the oil without regard to who sold it to them.

He also realized that strategic dependence on cheap oil from the Middle East would undermine U.S. national security and the U.S. military’s ability to project supply lines during the Cold War.

President Eisenhower imposed an oil import quota in 1959 to limit U.S. dependence on foreign crude. The price of oil in the United States was roughly double the world price, and OPEC was formed in response.  The U.S. oil industry was stable and robust.

This policy remained in place until his vice president, then President Nixon, removed the import restrictions.

The irony today is that the United States has initiated a tariffs regime in the name of national security for U.S. steel and aluminum industries but has excluded the oil industry from similar protection.  Why?

This policy today would benefit our national security by lessening our dependence on OPEC. Higher domestic oil prices will encourage more employment and encourage a faster transition to alternative fuels (see ‘Crude Oil Imports and National Security’ above).

Tariffs or import restrictions can eliminate the exposure to wild downward price swings and protect us from foe and friend.

In 2014, Saudi Arabia increased production to drive down price costing U.S. shale plays 250,000 direct jobs, 300+ bankruptcies, $250-plus billion in lost capital, billions in lost GDP and billions in lost local, state and federal taxes.

While the U.S. surge in domestic production is good, domestic refineries have not found it profitable to shift to the lighter crudes from the shale plays, and the industry exports much of it.

In the event of an Iranian blockade or war in the Strait of Hormuz, it is likely that Congress would again ban exports, but U.S. refiners may not be able to quickly adjust.

Releases from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve could possibly help in the short run, but it has never been tested at even 10 per cent of draw down capacity.  Consumers would face shortages and higher prices.

President Eisenhower showed us a way forward.

Ed Hirs teaches energy economics courses to undergraduate and graduate students within the department of economics at the University of Houston. He is also appointed as an inaugural University of Houston Energy Fellow. 

In addition to his teaching, Hirs is Managing Director for Hillhouse Resources, LLC, an independent E&P company developing onshore conventional oil and gas discoveries on the Texas Gulf Coast.  Previously, Ed was CFO of DJ Resources, Inc., an early leader in the Niobrara Shale.

The post Opinion: Oil prices at $200-plus per barrel? Iran can make it happen appeared first on Thoughtful Journalism About Energy's Future.