By Michael J. Armstrong

The United States and Israel have repeatedly boasted about airstrikes in their current war with Iran. In Week 1, they claimed the destruction of 75 per cent of Iran’s missile launchers. By Week 2, they had reduced Iranian missile fire by 90 per cent and said the war was “already won in many ways.”

And yet, Iran keeps damaging refineries and blocking tankers from crossing the Strait of Hormuz.

The country has certainly suffered many tactical losses. But its missiles and drones have been strategically successful.

Iran so far has launched at least 5,400 such projectiles. Surprisingly, less than a tenth of them have targeted Israel, its traditional rival.

Missiles over Israel

Israel faced about 450 Iranian missile attacks during the war’s first four weeks. The rate of fire fell rapidly after the first weekend but has never halted.

Some missiles carry several hundred kilograms of explosives, enough to destroy an entire building. The rest instead dispense dozens of cluster bombs over wide areas. Those are less powerful but still lethal.

Israel’s long-range Arrow interceptors engage the missiles first. Its mid-range David’s Sling and short-range Iron Dome interceptors provide backup. (The country’s Iron Beam lasers are not being used.) Together, they’ve reportedly intercepted 92 per cent of incoming missiles.

But interceptors sometimes miss. And their supply is limited. Consequently, at least nine large warheads and 150 cluster bombs have hit populated areas.

These numbers imply that almost all Iranian missiles are accurate enough to need interception. By contrast, during Israel’s earlier conflicts with Gaza in 2008, 2011 and 2014, less than a third of incoming rockets were so accurate.

Meanwhile, more than 90 per cent of Iran’s missiles and drones have targeted Arab countries in the Persian Gulf.

Drones across the Persian Gulf

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) collectively reported around 4,900 Iranian attacks during the first four weeks. Only one fifth were missiles: the rest were drones.

These countries have stated they are neutral in the war. However, they do have defence agreements with the U.S., and some host American military facilities.

These countries defend themselves using weapons like the U.S.-made Patriot and Israeli-made SPYDER interceptors. Drone experts from Ukraine now advise the defenders too.

For example, the UAE reported attacks by 1,835 drones, 378 ballistic missiles and 15 cruise missiles. As of March 10, it claimed to have intercepted 94 per cent of the drones and 99 per cent of the missiles.

The deadliness of these attacks has varied.

Continuing lethality

In Israel, Iranian missiles have killed 20 people, implying roughly 4.1 deaths per hundred missiles arriving.

That’s less than the 5.1 the country saw during its 2025 war with Iran. But it’s four to 40 times higher than the rates it suffered from rockets in earlier Gaza and Lebanon conflicts.

In the Persian Gulf, Iranian projectiles have killed at least 15 civilians, 13 U.S. soldiers and seven merchant sailors.

There were about 0.6 deaths per hundred Iranian attacks in Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE combined. That’s much lower than Israel’s rate, presumably because those countries were attacked by drones and short-range missiles carrying smaller warheads.

Interestingly, although the quantity of Iranian attacks fell after the first week, their lethality did not. Death rates per projectile in Arab countries showed little change week-to-week. In Israel, the rates were highest in Week 3.

In fact, Iranian missiles keep hitting precise targets, like U.S. military aircraft parked beside runways.

This implies Iran’s government has recovered from its initial surprise. It’s likely benefiting from Russian intelligence and Chinese technology too.

Tactical U.S. vs strategic Iran

So, U.S. and Israeli warplanes have bombed thousands of targets, killed thousands of civilians, and slowed Iran’s missile fire. But they haven’t stopped it.

That’s not surprising. Airstrikes alone didn’t stop rocket fire during Israel’s previous conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon. Ground invasions were needed for that.

U.S. President Donald Trump can post jingoistic mashup videos and “bullshit” about having “militarily won” the war in Iran. But he hasn’t achieved strategic outcomes like “unconditional surrender” from Iran or regime change there.

By contrast, Iran’s missiles have been strategically effective. They’ve damaged Persian Gulf refineries and halted tanker traffic. They’ve forced Trump to relax sanctions on Russian and Iranian oil, and on Belarusian fertilizer. And they’ve shown Arab monarchies that U.S. defence agreements have limited value.

Trump recently, and inadvertently, admitted this weakness. While discussing Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz, he said “it would be great if we could do something, but they have to open it.”

This strategic failure despite tactical success is reminiscent of the Vietnam War. U.S. units had overwhelming firepower as they killed enemy soldiers. But body counts by themselves indicated little about strategic progress.

Some historians rank that war as the second worst U.S. foreign policy decision ever. The 2003 invasion of Iraq was ranked the worst.

Trump talks about being the greatest U.S. president in history. So, perhaps his Iran war will make him the new leader on that policy failure list.

The post Iran’s attacks drone on, with the U.S. at risk of losing the war appeared first on Thoughtful Journalism About Energy's Future.

by John Duncan

The Iranian regime is certainly brutal. But it’s also powerful as it continues to project its might after a month of illegal air strikes by the United States and Israel.

Read more: Iran’s attacks drone on, with the U.S. at risk of losing the war

Iran is in the top 10 per cent of countries by size and population, has the third largest proven petroleum reserves and controls strategically crucial geography.

Furthermore, both the regime and many ordinary Iranians are prepared to defend the country. Since 1953, when the U.S. helped orchestrate a coup to overthrow Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, Iranians have understood they’re in America’s crosshairs.

This was especially true after the 1979 Islamic Revolution that overthrew the shah and during the U.S.-backed Iraq war against Iran that killed a million Iranians in the 1980s. As a result, Iran has spent decades beefing up and decentralizing its military capability.

In contrast, Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, warned U.S. President Donald Trump in February that the U.S. was short on both munitions and allied support for a war against Iran. Israel, America’s partner in war, is also short, especially in interceptor munitions. Trump and Israeli leader Benjamin Netanyahu dismissed the concerns, which suggests they planned a short war.

What are Trump’s options?

Critics have accused Trump of dragging the U.S. — or allowing it to be dragged — into a “forever war.” Those critics include those in his MAGA base, a problem for Trump as he anticipates November’s mid-term elections.

One unconventional option that might expedite victory, discussed during Trump’s first term, is to use nuclear weapons against Iran. Trump has said nukes won’t be used, but he’s well-known for erratic reversals.

A nuclear strike might expedite surrender, but it took two strikes on Japan in 1945 before the Japanese surrendered, and, failing an Iranian surrender, several strikes might be required to destroy the military capability distributed across Iran’s 31 provinces. Because many Americans would be appalled by a nuclear attack, putting the mid-terms at risk, the nuclear option is unlikely.

Much of the concern about Trump’s election machinations heading into the mid-terms is focused on the manipulation of procedures and officials. The legacy of the Jan. 6, 2021 attacks on the U.S. Capitol is one extreme possibility, as is manipulating the Iran war to achieve electoral gains.

Trump will probably lean into his rhetorical strengths and try to convince Americans the U.S. has won when it hasn’t. Claiming victory in the face of its absence is not new to him. Even in his second term, Trump continues to push the false claim that he won the 2020 election.

Consider the bizarre drama that started on March 21 when Trump and Iran exchanged dire threats. Then, out of the blue, Trump declared the existence of peace talks, which Iran denied. Perhaps they are imaginary talks on the way to an imaginary victory for Trump.

Read more: Why Donald Trump is such a relentless bullshitter

Mission accomplished?

It seems clear Trump is planning to declare victory well ahead of the mid-terms — and in part because of them. Such a strategy would involve baiting opponents into “forever war” criticisms, only to ridicule them in stump speeches, generating the image of a president who finishes his wars.

A declared victory in Iran and a timely exit, in addition to the liberation of Venezuela and a possible Cuban coup, might all coalesce into potent election messaging for the Republicans.

Soon enough, Trump may announce something akin to former president George W. Bush’s premature proclamations about the Iraq War in 2003 by saying something like this:

“Major combat operations in Iran have ended. The United States and Israel have prevailed. We do not know the day of final victory, but we have seen the turning of the tide.”

If successful, he will secure two more years “like nobody’s ever seen before” of Republican congressional dominance.

Major obstacles

The battle for November will feature a few competing narratives in the U.S. But there are four major hurdles for Trump in particular.

• Information: For voters to be convinced that Trump is a decisive crusader against evil rather than another “forever war” president, right-wing media must sell yet another big lie, mainstream media must continue to pull its punches and the Democrats must continue to flounder.
• Affordability crisis: Trump also has to ensure he doesn’t “win” in Iran while losing on affordability at home. Most American oil comes from the U.S., Canada and Mexico, so the U.S. is protected from global supply disruptions, but global markets push up prices everywhere. Trump’s mere declaration of talks recently brought oil prices down, but only temporarily.
• Allies needed: Because voters will want to see a significant military withdrawal, Trump needs other countries to manage the chaos he’s created. But after disrespecting allies for months, he is struggling to establish a “coalition of the willing” on which to offload the conflict.
• Iranians must co-operate: But because the U.S. and Israel have twice attacked Iran during diplomatic negotiations, Iran needs other stakeholders in the process. Without them, Iran will not be incentivized to stop fighting and nothing will belie an imaginary Trump victory more than ongoing Iranian attacks.

Democracy waning

Whichever scenario prevails, Americans will likely lose. Their complete war costs could include repercussions from the unprecedented illegal bombing of Iran, as well as from unnecessarily turning regional allies into targets.

All of this is tied to what many Americans regard as increasing Israeli aggression, including the killing of 70,000 people in Gaza, which the U.S. has facilitated with funding, political cover and its widely mocked Board of Peace.

America’s democracy, economy and credibility are waning as Trump shamelessly pursues self-aggrandizement and self-enrichment.

“That makes me smart,” he might say, but only a failed leader serves his own interests at the expense of his country.

The post Why Donald Trump will try to declare victory in Iran well before November appeared first on Thoughtful Journalism About Energy's Future.

By Candace Dunn and Justine Barden

The Strait of Hormuz, located between Oman and Iran, connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. The strait is deep enough and wide enough to handle the world’s largest crude oil tankers, and it is one of the world’s most important oil chokepoints. Large volumes of oil flow through the strait, and very few alternative options exist to move oil out of the strait if it is closed. In 2024, oil flow through the strait averaged 20 million barrels per day (b/d), or the equivalent of about 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption. In the first quarter of 2025, total oil flows through the Strait of Hormuz remained relatively flat compared with 2024.

Although we have not seen maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz blocked following recent tensions in the region, the price of Brent crude oil (a global benchmark) increased from $69 per barrel (b) on June 12 to $74/b on June 13. This piece highlights the importance of the strait to global oil supplies.

Chokepoints are narrow channels along widely used global sea routes that are critical to global energy security. The inability of oil to transit a major chokepoint, even temporarily, can create substantial supply delays and raise shipping costs, potentially increasing world energy prices. Although most chokepoints can be circumvented by using other routes—often adding significantly to transit time—some chokepoints have no practical alternatives. Most volumes that transit the strait have no alternative means of exiting the region, although there are some pipeline alternatives that can avoid the Strait of Hormuz.

Between 2022 and 2024, volumes of crude oil and condensate transiting the Strait of Hormuz declined by 1.6 million b/d, which were only partially offset by a 0.5-million b/d increase in petroleum product cargoes. The decline in oil transit through the strait partially reflects the OPEC+ decision to voluntarily cut crude oil production several times starting in November 2022, which lowered exports from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). In addition, disruptions in 2024 to oil flows around the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Arabian Sea to the Red Sea, led Saudi Arabia’s national oil company Aramco to shift seaborne crude oil flows from the Strait of Hormuz, instead sending it over land through its East-West pipeline to ports on the Red Sea. Also, more refining capacity in the Persian Gulf states increased regional demand for crude oil and shifted some flows to local markets within the Persian Gulf.

Flows through the Strait of Hormuz in 2024 and the first quarter of 2025 made up more than one-quarter of total global seaborne oil trade and about one-fifth of global oil and petroleum product consumption. In addition, around one-fifth of global liquefied natural gas trade also transited the Strait of Hormuz in 2024, primarily from Qatar.

Based on tanker tracking data published by Vortexa, Saudi Arabia moves more crude oil and condensate through the Strait of Hormuz than any other country. In 2024, exports of crude and condensate from Saudi Arabia accounted for 38% of total Hormuz crude flows (5.5 million b/d).

Alternative routes
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have some infrastructure in place that can bypass the Strait of Hormuz, which may somewhat mitigate any transit disruptions through the strait. The pipelines do not typically operate at full capacity, and we estimate that about 2.6 million b/d of capacity from the Saudi and UAE pipelines could be available to bypass the Strait of Hormuz in the event of a supply disruption.

Saudi Aramco operates the 5 million-b/d East-West crude oil pipeline, which runs from the Abqaiq oil processing center near the Persian Gulf to the Yanbu port on the Red Sea. Aramco temporarily expanded the pipeline’s capacity to 7.0 million b/d in 2019 when it converted some natural gas liquids pipelines to accept crude oil. In 2024, Saudi Arabia pumped more crude oil through the East-West pipeline to avoid the shipping disruptions around the Bab al-Mandeb.

The UAE also operates a pipeline that bypasses the Strait of Hormuz. This 1.8 million-b/d pipeline links onshore oil fields to the Fujairah export terminal in the Gulf of Oman. In 2024, crude oil and condensate volumes originating in the UAE and traversing Hormuz were 0.4 million b/d less than in 2022 because refinery upgrades allowed more heavy crude oil to be refined locally. These upgrades also allowed the UAE to increase exports of its lighter crude oil grades, and use of the pipeline to the Fujairah export terminal increased. Increased use of the pipeline for day-to-day operations has limited the excess capacity available to reroute additional volumes around the Strait of Hormuz.

Iran inaugurated the Goreh-Jask pipeline and the Jask export terminal on the Gulf of Oman (avoiding the Strait of Hormuz) with a single export cargo in July 2021. The pipeline’s effective capacity remains around 300,000 b/d. However, during the summer of 2024 Iran exported less than 70,000 b/d from ports (Bandar-e-Jask and Kooh Mobarak) using the Goreh-Jask pipeline and stopped loading cargoes after September 2024.

Destination markets
We estimate that 84% of the crude oil and condensate and 83% of the liquefied natural gas that moved through the Strait of Hormuz went to Asian markets in 2024. China, India, Japan, and South Korea were the top destinations for crude oil moving through the Strait of Hormuz to Asia, accounting for a combined 69% of all Hormuz crude oil and condensate flows in 2024. These markets would likely be most affected by supply disruptions at Hormuz.

In 2024, the United States imported about 0.5 million b/d of crude oil and condensate from Persian Gulf countries through the Strait of Hormuz, accounting for about 7% of total U.S. crude oil and condensate imports and 2% of U.S. petroleum liquids consumption. In 2024, U.S. crude oil imports from countries in the Persian Gulf were at the lowest level in nearly 40 years as domestic production and imports from Canada have increased.

The post Amid regional conflict, the Strait of Hormuz remains critical oil chokepoint appeared first on Thoughtful Journalism About Energy's Future.

Dubai, United Arab Emirates, 18 October 2023: The livelihoods of over half a billion people in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are under threat, as current projections indicate a 4°C increase by 2050. A new World Economic Forum report, Closing the Climate Action Gap: Accelerating Decarbonization and the Energy Transition in MENA, highlights the key sustainability challenges in the region and provides a blueprint for bold decarbonization actions that could fuel new economic opportunities.

The report’s findings indicate how local leaders could simultaneously counter these projections while fostering greater economic diversification and high-quality jobs. This would spur on the regional momentum for holistic climate action, as illustrated by the back-to-back hosting of COP27 in Egypt and COP28 in the UAE, and position MENA as a global leader in sustainable technologies for years.

The report was developed in collaboration with Bain & Company, with contributions from more than 40 policy-makers, climate actors, business leaders, banks and industry experts from the private and public sectors who form the Forum’s Leaders for Sustainable MENA .

’The MENA region has been one of the fastest growing regions over the past decade and there is a pathway for the region to position itself at the forefront of sustainability efforts while maintaining its upward economic trajectory,” said Børge Brende, President, World Economic Forum. “As global markets continue to shift, and energy demands rise, the region requires bold and coordinated action from policy-makers and businesses to lead a just energy transition and meet both climate- and development-related goals.”

According to the report research, temperatures in the region are rising at twice the global average rate, presenting an array of challenges in the coming decades that could threaten the livelihoods of the 575 million people who live there, 70 per cent of them in low-income countries. Climate shocks, such as rising temperatures and prolonged droughts, could have serious effects on agriculture and liveability, as well as a compound effect on MENA’s systemic issues.

The report finds that MENA countries trail behind comparable regions in terms of their sustainability progress. While local governments have pledged in the past 24 months to bring 60 per cent of MENA’s emissions under the net zero ambition, businesses overall have yet to follow suit and bridge the gap with comparable global markets –12 per cent have set up a net zero target and 6 per cent have established a roadmap to reach net zero.

“Successfully transitioning to a sustainable future will hinge on bold measures from policymakers and companies, raising awareness and multi-stakeholder partnerships”, said Tom De Waele, Managing Partner of Bain & Company Middle East. “But while this sustainability action for Middle East requires significant investment of time and resources, it also represents a significant economic opportunity, which could well position the MENA region at the heart of global energy transition and unlock doors to economic diversification, high-quality job creation, and global leadership in low-carbon technologies.”

With abundant natural resources like solar and wind energy, and significant land availability, the region could become a global leader in scaling new energy pathways, such as renewables and clean hydrogen. Coupled with capital availability and decisive governance in the largest economies, these characteristics could facilitate MENA’s transition to a decarbonized economy while helping it meet the growing international demand for clean energy.

“Today, we find ourselves at a clean-energy tipping point and the good news is that there has never been so much momentum, so much convergence in market demand, technology, regulation and public sentiment.” said Henadi Al-Saleh, Chairperson, Agility. “As a result, climate-related activity by companies and investors has already shifted from risk mitigation to opportunity capture. The MENA region has abundant resources, talent, ambition – and renewable resources in the form solar and wind – to lead the way and make significant contributions to the global decarbonization drive.”

The report offers a tailored roadmap for regional policy-makers and businesses to advance sustainability action and facilitate economic diversification through the energy transition, considering the characteristics and needs of both the Gulf and non-Gulf countries alike.

To safeguard economic growth and global energy influence, Gulf nations should focus on technology-based solutions that reduce emissions in challenging sectors, optimize consumption, transition to renewables and implement carbon capture at scale. Meanwhile, non-Gulf countries should prioritize affordable energy, particularly in low-income areas, by increasing renewable energy usage, phasing out regressive fossil fuel subsidies and supporting carbon credit projects.

Upskilling in green jobs through skill development programmes and industry partnerships will be crucial across the region.

The post MENA Green Transition: Unlocking economic opportunities to drive climate action appeared first on Thoughtful Journalism About Energy's Future.

This article was published by the US Energy Information Administration on July 23, 2019.

The Suez Canal and the SUMED Pipeline are strategic routes for Persian Gulf crude oil, petroleum products, and liquefied natural gas (LNG) shipments to Europe and North America. Located in Egypt, the Suez Canal connects the Red Sea with the Mediterranean Sea, and it is a critical chokepoint because of the large volumes of energy commodities that flow through it.

Chokepoints are narrow channels along widely used global sea routes that are critical to global energy security. Total oil flows through the Suez Canal and the SUMED pipeline accounted for about 9 per cent of total seaborne traded petroleum (crude oil and refined petroleum products) in 2017, and LNG flows through the Suez Canal and the SUMED pipeline accounted for about 8 per cent of global LNG trade.

Since 2016, growth in northbound total petroleum flows through the Suez Canal and the SUMED pipeline has slowed, and southbound flows through the canal have risen substantially. In particular, the Suez Canal is gaining importance as a southbound route for U.S. and Russian crude oil and petroleum products to destinations in Asia and the Middle East.

Slightly more than half of total petroleum transiting the Suez Canal in 2018 was sent northbound to destinations in Europe and North America. Petroleum exports from Persian Gulf countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran, accounted for 85% of Suez Canal northbound traffic. Northbound flows of petroleum products have risen in recent years, particularly as more ultra-low sulfur diesel fuel has been shipped from Saudi Arabia to European countries.

Northbound crude oil flows decreased in 2018 for several reasons:

• Higher U.S. crude oil exports displaced Persian Gulf crude oil that had been historically sent to Europe.
• Key Middle East producers, mainly Saudi Arabia and Iraq, have been increasing crude oil exports to China and other growing Asian oil markets using eastbound routes rather than the Suez Canal.
• Renewed U.S. oil sanctions on Iran, imposed in late 2018, contributed to a decrease in Iran’s crude oil exports to Europe.

Southbound crude oil shipments, mainly to Asian markets such as Singapore, China, and India, have more than doubled in the past two years. Petroleum exports from Russia accounted for the largest share (24%) of Suez southbound petroleum traffic. Increases in Libya’s crude oil production and exports in 2018 also contributed to a rise in southbound shipments. In the past two years, increased production and exports of U.S. crude oil and petroleum products—especially liquefied petroleum gas—have also increased southbound traffic through the canal.

Overall LNG flows through the Suez Canal have declined in recent years. Nearly all (98%) of the northbound LNG transit is from Qatar and mainly destined for European markets. Although Qatar remains a key exporter of LNG through the canal, it has been diverting more cargoes to Asia in recent years.

Changes in LNG traffic through the Suez Canal also reflect the growth in U.S. shale gas production and LNG exports, falling LNG demand in some European countries, and competition for LNG in the global market, especially in Asia.

The 200-mile long SUMED Pipeline transports crude oil northbound through Egypt from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea. Crude oil flows through two parallel pipelines that have a total maximum flow capacity of 2.8 million barrels per day. The SUMED Pipeline is the only alternative route to transport crude oil from the Red Sea to the Mediterranean Sea if ships cannot navigate through the Suez Canal. Crude oil flows through the SUMED Pipeline have declined since 2016 as a result of the shifting oil trade patterns and a widening of the Suez Canal.

Principal contributors: Candace Dunn, Natalie Kempkey

The post Suez Canal, SUMED Pipeline critical chokepoints for oil, natural gas trade appeared first on Thoughtful Journalism About Energy's Future.

By Justine Barden

The Strait of Hormuz, located between Oman and Iran, connects the Persian Gulf with the Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea. The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s most important oil chokepoint because of the large volumes of oil that flow through the strait.

In 2018, its daily oil flow averaged 21 million barrels per day (b/d), or the equivalent of about 21 per cent of global petroleum liquids consumption.

Chokepoints are narrow channels along widely used global sea routes that are critical to global energy security. The inability of oil to transit a major chokepoint, even temporarily, can lead to substantial supply delays and higher shipping costs, resulting in higher world energy prices.

Although most chokepoints can be circumvented by using other routes that add significantly to transit time, some chokepoints have no practical alternatives.

Volumes of crude oil, condensate, and petroleum products transiting the Strait of Hormuz have been fairly stable since 2016, when international sanctions on Iran were lifted and Iran’s oil production and exports returned to pre-sanctions levels.

Flows through the Strait of Hormuz in 2018 made up about one-third of total global seaborne traded oil. More than one-quarter of global liquefied natural gas trade also transited the Strait of Hormuz in 2018.

There are limited options to bypass the Strait of Hormuz. Only Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have pipelines that can ship crude oil outside the Persian Gulf and have the additional pipeline capacity to circumvent the Strait of Hormuz.

At the end of 2018, the total available crude oil pipeline capacity from the two countries combined was estimated at 6.5 million b/d. In that year, 2.7 million b/d of crude oil moved through the pipelines, leaving about 3.8 million b/d of unused capacity that could have bypassed the strait.

Based on tanker tracking data published by ClipperData, Saudi Arabia moves the most crude oil and condensate through the Strait of Hormuz, most of which is exported to other countries (less than 0.5 million b/d transited the strait in 2018 from Saudi ports in the Persian Gulf to Saudi ports in the Red Sea).

EIA estimates that 76 per cent of the crude oil and condensate that moved through the Strait of Hormuz went to Asian markets in 2018. China, India, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore were the largest destinations for crude oil moving through the Strait of Hormuz to Asia, accounting for 65 per cent of all Hormuz crude oil and condensate flows in 2018.

In 2018, the United States imported about 1.4 million b/d of crude oil and condensate from Persian Gulf countries through the Strait of Hormuz, accounting for about 18 per cent of total U.S. crude oil and condensate imports and 7 per cent of total U.S. petroleum liquids consumption.

The post Strait of Hormuz is the world’s most important oil transit chokepoint appeared first on Thoughtful Journalism About Energy's Future.

Middle Eastern desalinated water technology currently relies heavily on fossil fuels

By Molly Walton

This article was published by International Energy Agency on Jan. 22, 2019.

Perhaps more than in other parts of the world, in the Middle East energy and water are closely intertwined. Any discussion about the outlook for electricity in the region also becomes a discussion about water.

As we examined in detail in the latest WEO special report, Outlook for Producer Economies, this is largely because of the way that the Middle East has turned to desalination to help narrow the gap between freshwater withdrawals and sustainable supply.

But this reliance on water desalination comes at a significant cost. In 2016, desalination accounted for just 3 per cent of the Middle East’s water supply but 5 per cent of its total energy consumption.

Countries in the Middle East already have some of the lowest water availability levels on a per-capita basis in the world. And economic and population growth in the region are set to increase demand for water over the coming decades, a period during which rising temperatures in the region could impose further constraints on water supply.

Moreover, the consistent under-pricing of both water and energy has encouraged the inefficient use of water and contributed to unsustainable levels of withdrawals from non-renewable groundwater resources. While roughly 85 per cent of the region’s water withdrawals are for agriculture, the value added to the region’s GDP from the sector is less than 5 per cent.

The growing reliance on desalination in the Middle East underlines the importance of effective management of the water-energy nexus, with knock-on implications for energy and water security.

How things play out in the next decade will depend a lot on the policies and technologies that are put in place.

Membrane technologies that use electricity, such as reverse osmosis, are the most common desalination technology installed worldwide. But the Middle East is an exception. The low cost of oil and gas and the prevalence of co-generation facilities for power and water means the region relies heavily on fossil fuel-based thermal desalination (such as multi-stage flash or multiple-effect desalination).

Two-thirds of the water produced from seawater desalination in the region today is from fossil fuel-based thermal desalination, while the rest is from membrane-based desalination that relies heavily on electricity produced using natural gas.

Overall, the Middle East accounts for roughly 90 per cent of the thermal energy used for desalination worldwide, led by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

But the use of membrane technologies is growing in the region. Reverse osmosis technologies accounts for 60 per cent of capacity in Oman and roughly half of the capacity in Saudi Arabia.

All of the contracted plants currently under construction in Saudi Arabia and a majority of planned capacity are reverse osmosis desalination plants, including the Rabigh 3 project being developed by Saudi Arabia Water & Electricity, which is expected to come online in 2021 and has the potential to become one of the largest membrane-based seawater desalination plants in the world.

In our outlook to 2040, the production of desalinated seawater in the Middle East is projected to increase almost fourteen-fold to 2040, and there is a concerted shift towards membrane-based desalination in both our New Policies Scenario (NPS) and Sustainable Development scenarios (SDS).

Why the shift in approach? There are a few main reasons:

• The cost of membrane-based technologies for desalination continues to decline, making them the technologies of choice for new capacity.
• The disadvantage of using domestic hydrocarbons for thermal desalination is underlined by anticipated reforms to energy pricing, which reduce fossil-fuel consumption subsidies. The use of domestic oil and gas resources for thermal desalination also cuts into potential export revenues.
• The electricity mix is changing, with many countries in the region looking to exploit their (highly under-utilized) potential for renewables. The region has some of the highest solar irradiation rates in the world and some countries have received some of the lowest bids seen so far for solar projects, but there is only around 1 GW of solar capacity in the Middle East today, compared with some 90 GW of oil-fired generation capacity.
• Even more importantly, pairing more co-generation plants with reverse osmosis technologies instead of thermal technologies would allow for greater operational flexibility and for the system to be used as a demand response facility: it could help ensure an outlet during periods of excess electricity production from solar, with water storage tanks effectively serving as energy storage.
• In addition, relying more on renewables, depending on the technologies, can reduce the water intensity of electricity generation and thus water demand from the power sector, as the water needs for solar photovoltaic and wind compared to other technologies or fuels is low.

By 2040, over three-quarters of the water produced in the Middle East in the NPS is from membrane-based desalination. However, because the power sector remains heavily reliant on natural gas and oil for power generation in 2040, most desalination still depends on fossil fuel-based electricity.

The share of desalination in the region’s total final energy consumption also rises to reach almost 15 per cent in 2040 and accounts for roughly a quarter of the region’s water supply.

A more rapid phase-out of subsidies for fossil fuels in the SDS results in a higher share of water production from membrane-based and Concentrating Solar Power desalination in 2040 than in the NPS.

The policy choices taken in the SDS also lead to the deployment of more renewables, which account for over half of power generation by 2040. This shift not only reduces carbon dioxide emissions and local air pollutants, but also allows for more effective management of the region’s energy and water needs.

The post Opinion: Desalinated water affects the energy equation in the Middle East appeared first on Thoughtful Journalism About Energy's Future.

Energy consumption growth in Asia, Middle East and Africa hit about 20 per cent between 2010-2016

By Ari Kahan

This article was published by the US Energy Information Administration on Jan. 10, 2019. 

Energy consumption in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa continues to grow rapidly, with about 20 per cent growth in each region between 2010 and 2016, according to newly available data in EIA’s International Energy Statistics database.

In particular, energy consumption has been increasing in the Middle East and Africa, driven by economic growth, increased access to energy markets, and quickly growing populations. Energy consumption in Asia grew even as energy consumption in China declined between 2015 and 2016.

Although growth was rapid in Africa and the Middle East, Asia and Oceania consumed much more energy overall (42 per cent of 2016 world energy consumption, compared with 6 per cent in the Middle East and 3 per cent in Africa).

Slower long-term energy consumption trends continued in the mature economies of North America, where energy consumption grew by 1 per cent between 2010 and 2016, and in Europe, where energy consumption actually fell 4 per cent between those years.

Globally, petroleum and other liquid fuels (including biofuels such as ethanol and biodiesel) are the most prevalent form of energy consumed. Growing use of these fuels has been supported by increasing supplies of U.S. shale oil and other international sources of liquid fuels that have kept prices relatively competitive.

Global coal consumption continued to decline as a result of competition from low cost natural gas as well as some countries’ policies to limit or decrease coal use.

Regional fuel use varies according to the availability of resources. In 2016, coal accounted for almost 50 per cent of the energy consumed in Asia and Oceania, where China, India, and Australia are all significant consumers of coal.

The largest shares of nuclear and renewable energy were in Europe (26 per cent), North America (19 per cent), and Central and South America (26 per cent).

These regions, particularly Europe and North America, have significant renewable resources as well as policies that encourage renewable energy usage, especially wind and solar. Because of the region’s rich reserves of oil and natural gas, nearly all energy consumption in the Middle East comes from either petroleum or natural gas with virtually no contribution from coal, nuclear, or renewable energy.

From 2000 to 2013, China experienced rapid growth in energy consumption, overtaking the United States as the world’s largest energy consumer in 2009. Since 2013, China has consistently used approximately 40 per cent more energy than the United States.

Although growth in China’s gross domestic product (GDP) has slowed over this time period, it continues to grow faster than 6 per cent per year compared with relatively flat total energy consumption, demonstrating the country’s improvements in energy intensity (GDP per unit energy).

By comparison, India’s GDP is growing at a rate of almost 8 per cent per year, and energy use is growing as well. In recent years, India has surpassed Japan, Canada, and Germany in energy consumed. As more recent data become available, India is likely to surpass Russia as the third-highest energy consuming country.

Detailed country-level data on energy production, consumption, and transport through 2016 are available in EIA’s International Energy Statistics database.

Natural gas data, petroleum supply data, GDP, and population are available through 2017. EIA Country Analysis Briefs supplement the International Energy Statistics database with key information on energy production and consumption trends.

The post Energy consumption growth driven by the Middle East, Africa, and Asia appeared first on Thoughtful Journalism About Energy's Future.

Trump railed against Iran nuclear deal during election campaign

Two White House sources tell Reuters that US President Donald Trump has all but decided to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, but they say they are unsure exactly how he will abandon the agreement.

The 2015 Iran deal was signed by the parties to curb Iran’s nuclear program in return for sanctions relief.  It was among former US President Barack Obama’s signature foreign policies, but in the past, Trump has described it as “one of the worst  deals I have ever witnessed”.

Should Trump decide to end US sanctions relief, the agreement would be in serious jeopardy.  Iran could then decide to resume its nuclear arms program or “punish” US allies in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon, diplomats told Reuters.

Trump has until May 12 to make his decision on renewing “waivers” which suspend some US sanctions on Iran.  According to one of the sources, Trump may end up not completely pulling out of the agreement, but the source was unable to describe any details of such a move.

According to Reuters, there is a possibility that Trump may opt to keep the US in the international pact, in part because of “alliance maintenance” with France after French President Emmanuel Macron urged Trump to remain in the agreement when the two met in Washington last week.

On Monday, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu offered a presentation on what he described as documentary evidence that Iran was not complying with the pact.  UN inspectors say Iran has been in compliance with the agreement and Iran flatly denied Netanyahu’s claims.

As well, Iran denies ever seeking nuclear weapons and accuses Israel of inciting suspicions.

As for Trump, the White House official who spoke to Reuters said the president was “most of the way there toward pulling out of the deal but he hasn’t made the decision” and that he “seems poised to do it but until a decision is made by this president it is not final.”

Another White House official said top aides are not aggressively trying to talk Trump out of withdrawal because he seems intent on it.

The post Trump all but ready to abandon Iran nuclear deal: WH sources appeared first on Thoughtful Journalism About Energy's Future.